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I. Introduction
In February 1813 Congress handily passed and the President enthusiastically
signed' a piece of ground-breaking legislation which has been long overlooked
by legal historians|An Act to Encourage Vaccination. 2 The Act established
a national source for uncontaminated, smallpox vaccine. Without any textual
basis in the Constitution, Congress mandated that a Presidentially appointed
National Vaccine Agent preserve supplies of genuine vaccine matter and furnish
the same to any citizen of the United States, whenever it might be applied
for.3 Congress subsidized the distribution of vaccine through a valuable franking
privilege, providing free postage to and from the Vaccine Agent.4 The Act was
passed at the urging of a crusading Baltimore physician, Dr. James Smith who
was immediately appointed the rst National Vaccine Agent.5
By all accounts, the 1813 Act was the rst federal government program
in our nation's history designed to improve the health and well-being of the
general populace.6 Smallpox was among the most feared diseases of the 19th
century, and the discovery of vaccination in 1798 was widely hailed as a near
miraculous medical breakthrough.7 In passing the Act, Congress quickly stepped
into the moral and social controversies over vaccination8 and clearly endorsed
its practice. Given the medical technology of the time there was a
See infra text accompanying notes 25 1-259.
2 Act to Encourage Vaccination, ch. 37, 2 Stat. 806 (1813) repealed by An Act
to Repeal the Act to Encourage Vaccination, ch. 50, 3 Stat. 677 (1922).
2 Stat. 806,  1(1813).
2 Stat. 806, x 2 (1813).
See infra text accompanying note 260.
'See e.g., PETER B. HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND
DRUG LAW 661 (1991) (rst federal experiment in drug regulation); Morris
Kagan, Federal Public Health, 161. HIsT. MED. 256, 265, 276-277 (1961) (de-
scribing early Federal public health initiatives); Peter B. Hutt, Investigations
and Reports on the Food and DrugAdministration , in FOOD & DRUG LAW
41, 42 (Richard M. Cooper ed., 1991).
 infra Part II.A-B.
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signicant need for vaccine institutions to propagate pure quantities of the
vaccine between and during epidemics.9 Congress perceived that the private
markets would not be able to adequately guarantee a reliable supply of vaccine
and remarkably provided in 1813 for a semipublic source for vaccine.
Given the state of scientic knowledge, there was not much the federal gov-
ernment could have previously done to promote the public health other than
enforce quarantines. The national government had quickly enacted Quarantine
Acts,'1 and Congress was admonished by President Jeerson in 1805 to be alert
to the need to preempt state laws with federal Quarantine laws.'2 Vaccination,
however, presented the government with a unique opportunity. The Act rep-
resents the response of the federal government to its rst signicant chance to
act in the interests of the public health and welfare, to save countless lives.
The Act is also one of the rst episodes in the federal government's growing
intervention into the American economy and society to promote the General
Welfare during the rst century of the Republic. Today, we take the Centers for
Disease Control, the Food and Drug Administration, and similar agencies for
granted; public health institutions are one of the most respected sectors of the
Federal bureaucracy. In the early 19th century, however, federal establishment
of a public health program was quite an innovation. The
See infra Part ll.C.1.
9See infra Part ll.C.3.
'0See generally, WILSON SMILLIE, PUBLIC HEALTH: DEVELOPMENT
OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1914, at 111-270
(1955) (quarantine and general urban sanitation were the only known public
health measures in the ante-helium period).
See Act Relative to Quarantine, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474 (1796) repealed by Act
Respecting Quarantines & Health Laws, ch. 12,  8, 1 Stat. 619-21 (1799). For
a brief description of these quarantine laws see Kagan, supra note 6, at 264.
12 In his 1805 State of the Union, speaking with regards to an unnamed epidemic
which struck port cities that year, President Jeerson admonished Congress that
Although the health laws of the States should be found to need no present re-
visal [sic] by Congress, yet commerce claims that [Congress'] attention be ever
awake to them. Thomas Jeerson, Fifth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3,
1805) in 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 11-12 (1805).
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eorts of the National Vaccine Agent may have led to the vaccination of
50,000 Americans a year.'3
Despite the foresight shown by Congress in passing the Act, the 1813 Act
highlights one of the major public policy failures of 19th century American
government. In the early 19th century, smallpox vaccination was not the pe-
ripheral public policy issue it is today. Vaccination had the potential to save
tens of thousands of lives. Though the potential of smallpox vaccination was
well understood in this country by 1801, obstacles to eective implementation
of vaccination in this country were not surmounted until the end of the century.
There was a great need for a reliable national source of genuine smallpox vac-
cine, yet the Act itself was repealed after only nine years in the wake of a fatal
accident and public scandal.'4 The country was left without an authoritative
national source of trustworthy vaccine. Congress refused to seriously address
the issue again for 80 years. Moreover, state governments were also silent for
most of the 19th century; they refused to spend money to promote vaccination.'5
By any modern standard|economic, moral, or otherwise|the American gov-
ernment clearly failed in not imitating the eorts of European governments by
funding vaccination eorts and ensuring a reliable supply of vaccine.
Smallpox, thus, took a terrible, largely unnecessary toll in the United States
during the 19th century. Tens of thousands of lives were needlessly lost as a re-
sult of governmental inaction. European countries had shown the United States
that smallpox deaths were wholly unnecessary. A House committee observed
that by 1810 Denmark had practical eliminated smallpox by implementation
compulsory vaccination; vaccination in Prussia had reduced
' See infra text accompanying notes 312-314.
See infra Part VII.
' See infra Part III.
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smallpox's toll from 14% of all deaths, to only 1% of all deaths. The com-
mittee reported similar results in Bavaria, Lombardy, Geneva, and South Amer-
ica. 17 Small amounts of money could have had enormous benets.'8 By the
Civil War, the United States had also seen the benet of intensive vaccina-
tion programs for Native Americans. Without any hereditary immunities, the
Old-World diseases had taken a terrible toll on Native Americans.'9 A com-
prehensive federal vaccination eort was remarkably successful, however.20 By
the second-half of the 19th century smallpox mortality rates among Native peo-
ples was a fraction of that among the non-native population.2' Not surprisingly,
the rest of the country did not experience declines in smallpox incidence un-
til state governments nally began actively promoting vaccination at the end
of the century.22 The central government nally enacted a permanent legisla-
tive program to ensure the safety of the vaccine supply in 1902.23 This Paper's
account of government activity up to 1827 should be understood against the
general 19th century failure of American governments to eectively implement
vaccination.
See H.R. REP. No. 17-48 (1822).
'7For the history of vaccination in Europe, seeFRANK FENNER ET AL.,
SMALLPOX AND ITS ERADICATION 271-73 (1988).
18 For example, the New York Kine-Pox Dispensary vaccinated the poor at a
cost of about 754 per patient. See 1 JOHN DUFFY, HISTORY OF PUBLIC
HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY 247 (1968). James Smith requested only $1500
annually to support the preservation of genuine vaccine at his National Vaccine
Institution and the free universal distribution of vaccine through the mail. See
infra Part V.
 FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 23 8-240.
20 Federal eorts to vaccine Native Americans began in earnest with Act to
Provide the...
Benets of Vaccination. .. to the Indian Tribes, ch. 75, 4 Stat. 514 (1832)
(authorizing payments of $6 per day for doctors who were vaccinating Indi-
ans; the Secretary of War was obligated to provide these doctors with genuine
vaccine). The federal governments eorts to vaccinate Native Americans were
probably motivated by the horric toll taken by smallpox on the Native popu-
lation and feelings of paternalism.
z' See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 240.
22 But see FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 328-29 (decreasing mortality,
though not incidence, beginning
at end of century because of shift to less fatal strain of the disease).
23 Biologics Act, 32 Stat. 728 (1902) reenacted by Public Health Service Act,
58 Stat. 682, 702 (1944) now codedat 42 U.S.C.  262.
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As far as I know, this paper is the rst detailed examination of the Vaccine
Act and related history. Despite being the rst federal eort to tackle a national
health and safety issue, the Vaccine Act has received negligible attention from
legal historians. While histories of federal drug regulation or federal public
health initiatives discuss the Act in passing,24 broader legal and regulatory
histories do not even mention the Act.25 Even histories of smallpox and public
health pass over the Vaccine Act.2' The oversight is understandable: the Act
was repealed after only nine years;27 records of the Act's legislative history and
implementation are scarce;- and by modern standards, the Act's provisions were
quite modest. The 1813 Act may also have been overlooked because its history
does not t well into standard historical accounts of 19th century American
government.
Nineteenth century legal histories typically assert that the federal govern-
ment entirely refrained from actively intervening into American economy and
society until the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act. But these ac-
counts are simply wrong to imply that the norm of federal intervention sponta-
neously sprang-forth in the 1880s.29 Reading these accounts, one is left with the
idea that, aside from debates over slavery, ante-bellum Congresses was wholly
unconcerned with economic inequality and public safety. However, from the ear-
liest decades of the Republic, Congress enacted government programs designed
to
24 The most substantial history of the Act I have found is a two-page discus-
sion in William P. Pendergast, Biologic Drugs, in FOOD & DRUG LAW 303,
305-06 (Richard M. Cooper ed., 1991). For other brief accounts see Hutt, supra
note 6, at 42; HUTT & MERRIL, supra note 6, at 660-61.
25 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Histori cal Perspective,
38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1196-7
(1986); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
177-201 (1985); STEPHEN G. BREYER &
RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 13-29 (1985); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1991).
26 See, e.g., FENNER ET AL., supra note 17; SMILLIE, supra note 10;
Hodge, Implementing Modem Public Health Goals Through Government, 14J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L & POLICY 93 (1997).
27 The Act was repealed in 1822 after a public scandal. See infra Part V.
28 See infra text accompanying note 50.
29 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 25, at 1194-96, and other sources cited in
note 25.
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intervene in public life to promote the well-being of specic communities:
protecting sailors from exploitation,30 enforcing quarantines in port cities,3'
providing free medical care for sailors by taxing ships to support a marine hos-
pital service,32 granting land for an institution to care for the deaf and dumb,33
and providing health care for Indians.34 The 1813 Vaccine Act was the rst fed-
eral program aimed at the general populace, but immediately after the repeal
of the Vaccine Act, Congress began consideration of another program aimed at
the welfare of the general public|regulation of the safety of steamboats.35 This
paper is a modest attempt to begin to set the record straight by describing the
history of one of these early federal eorts.
Under most of the standard theories of the 19th century role of the govern-
ment in the economy and society|laissez-faire capitalism,3' business subsidy,
 public choice theory,38
30 See, e.g., Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 13 1-35 (1790).
 See, supra note and text accompanying note 11.
32 See, e.g., Act for the Relief of Sick & Disabled Seamen, ch. 77, 1 Stat.
605-06 (1798). For brief descriptions of the legislation and its enactment, see
RALPH. C. WILLIAMS, THE US PUBLIC HEALTH SERvICE 1798-1950, at
28-31 (1951); Kagan, supra note 6, at 276.
' See Revised Stat. of the U.S. x 4859-69 (1878).
' See supra note and text accompanying note 20.
' See Act to Provide for the Better Security of the Lives of Passengers...,
ch. 191, 5 Stat. 304-06 (1938) amended by ch. 105, 10 Stat. 61-75 (1852). For
descriptions of the steamboat regulations, see John G. Burke, Bursting Boilers
and the Federal Power, 7 TECH. & CULTuRE 1 (1966); LouIs C. HUNTER,
STEAMBOATS ON WESTERN RIVERS 520-546 (1949); JOHN MORRISON,
HISTORY OF AMERICAN STEAM NAVIGATION 59 1-615 (1903). While
Rabin has recognized the role of the steamboat regulations as a precursor to
later federal programs, see Rabin, supra note 25, at 1196, an authoritative ex-
ploration of the steamboat regulations awaits.
36 The idea that the century after the publication of Wealth of Nations was
marked by a deeply held commitment to laissez.faire government has enjoyed
surprisingly popularity over the years. See, e.g., JONATHAN LURIE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND ECONOMIC CHANGE 19 (1988); Morton Keller, The
Pluralist State, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE 56, 56-59, 64-69 (Thomas
K. McCraw ed., 1981); GEORGE DARGO, LAW IN THE NEW REPUBLIC
(1983). See also BREYER & STEWART, supra note 25, at 13-29 (1992) (ac-
knowledging that laissez-faire capitalism is the dominant explanation for the
inactivity of the
19th century federal government); William J. Novak, Public Economy & The
Well-Ordered Market, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 3-7 (1993) (asserting that his-
torians have generally seen Adam Smith's rhetoric as dominant ideology between
the Revolution and the Civil War); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE
AND AMERICAN LAW 1-5 (1991).
 The strict laissez-faire argument was largely debunked by scholars who
8uncovered extensive state government support of private enterprises throughout
the 19th century. SeeOSCAR AND MARY F. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH
(1969); JAMES WILLARD HURST, The Release of Energy in LAW AND THE
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES (1956). See also Harry N.
6
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saluspopuli,39 federalismj0 we would not even predict that Congress in 1813
would enact legislation like the Vaccine Act. These theories also have diculty
accounting for the apathy of state governments and Congress' repeated refusal
to devote funding to vaccination. The primary goal of this paper is not to
examine each of these theories or persuasively explain the behavior of American
governments towards smallpox. The inability of these theories to explain the
story of the Act is simply suggestive of the complexity of early 19th century
legal history.
Schieber, Property Law, Expropriation, andResourceAllocation by Govern-
ment, 1 789-1910 (1973) reprinted in AMERICAN LAW & THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORDER 132 (Lawrence M. Friedman, et al. eds., 1978) (To be sure,
the once-vigorous myth of ante-bellum laissez-faire has been discarded). Build-
ing on this body of work, Morton Horowitz famously proposed that the entire
19th century legal order was designed to maximize the wealth of a new class of
industrial entrepreneurs. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977). Horowitz's legal regime
would obviously not be expected to concern itself with public health and safety;
if anything, Horowitz's thesis predicts decreasing protection of consumers as
industrialists gained power.
38 The public choice theory of regulation arose out of a seminal economics
article by George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ.
OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971);see also Richard Posner, Theories of Eco-
nomic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974). For a good
review article see, Robert D. Tollison, Regulation and Interest Groups, in REG-
ULATION: ECONOMIC THEORY AND HISTORY 59 (Jack High ed., 1991).
Economists over the past quarter century have come to view all democratic gov-
ernment action as the product of interest groups exchanging votes and campaign
donations for narrow legislative advantage. Even health and safety regulations
are thought to be enacted at the request of dominant producers to raise barriers
to entry and growth for smaller producers. Public choice theorists reject the
idea that the public interest, or any other ideology, drives government actions.
Even the elimination of slavery is explained as the result of powerful nancial
interests. See Anderson, Rowley, and Tollison, R.ent Seeking and the Resric-
tion of Human Exchange, J. OF LEG. STUDIES 17 (1988). Cf GABRIEL
KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION (1965) (similar argument from
leftist historian regarding origin and development of ICC).
Recently, William Novak has persuasively made the case that the Horowitz
business subsidy depiction of the 19th century legal order is incomplete. No-
vak argues that state and local governments, in fact, extensively regulated the
economy to protect consumers and promote the general welfare. He uses the
slogan salus populi suprema lex, 'the welfare of the people is the highest law, to
capture this spirit. See
WILLIAM J. NOvAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE (1996). However, many
of the market regulations Novak emphasizes might conceivably have actually
served business interests a l public choice theory.
10 The least controversial explanation for the limited 19th century role of the na-
tional government looks to contemporaneous interpretations of the limited grant
of Congressional powerSee, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at 177 et seq. (the
federal government was not laissez.faire, but was strongly committed to federal-
ism); HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE & AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 80-82
(1991); Harry Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism, 14 YALEJ.
REG. 227, 227-239 (1996); Kagan, supra note 6, at 256. The conventional wis-
dom has it that early Congresses did not believe that they were free to promote
the general welfare of the populous; only the states were believed to be so free.
7
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The applicability of laissez-faire capitalism is undermined not only by Congress'
swift and painless enactment of the 1813 legislation and the serious consider-
ation given to major expansions of the Act,4' but also by the total absence of
the ideology from debates over encouragement of smallpox vaccination between
1809 and 1827.42 The very enactment of the Vaccine Act also questions the pre-
vailing wisdom regarding views of federalism in the early 19th century. There
is no explicit grant of Congressional power to justify the Vaccine Act,43 yet the
Act was quickly and painlessly passed by Congress in 1813. It appears that pub-
lic health and safety might not, as has commonly been supposed, have been the
sole province of state governments. Further state governments more even more
reluctant than the national government to get involved. Though the rhetoric
of federalism was deployed in debates over the extension of the Act and its re-
peal, there are good reasons to question the sincerity of that rhetoric. Upon
close analysis, the rhetoric of federalism was used simply to legitimate other
substantive dierences.45 Though the 1813 Act seems to t William Novak's
recent characterization of 19th century local governments as deeply committed
to the principle of salus populi suprema lex, the inaction of state authorities
thoroughly belies the salus populi
' See infra Parts IV and V. The Vaccine Act did not provide neutral rules
of road but was a conscious
eort to aect social change.
42 The laissez-faire argument does not even appear in the legislative debates
until 1882. See infra text accompanying notes 480-482.
Arguably the Congressional power 'To Establish Post-Oces authorized the
grant of the franking privilege in the Vaccine Act. U.S. CONST. Art. I, 
8, cl. 7. But there is no textual basis for the rest of the Vaccine Act which
demands that the National Vaccine Agent permanently maintain a supply of
genuine vaccine and distribute the vaccine upon request to all Americans.
See infra Part III.
Then, as now, federalism was a convenient principled cover for essentially
political dierences. President Madison's biographer, for example, questions
the sincerity of Madison's explanation for his veto of Calhoun's Bonus Bill.
The Bonus Bill would have allocated the $1,500,000 paid by the First Bank
of the United States for its charter to internal improvements of canals and
roads. Madison claimed that this allocation exceeded the national government's
powers, yet he had enthusiastically supported the Vaccine Act. Madison' resort
to federalism to oppose the Bonus Bill does not appear to have been principled.
See 6 IRVTNG BRANT, JAMES MADISON: COMMANDER IN CHIEF 415-
417 (1961); see also David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme
Court's Rediscovery of the Tenth A merndment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 358-
359 (1993).
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thesis. State governments were surprisingly apathetic to the suering of
their own citizens and reluctant to expend resources to support vaccination and
save lives.
The business subsidy and public choice theories are at least partially per-
suasive. Dr. James Smith, the immediate beneciary of the Act, does not t
the bill of a business or entrepreneurial interest. He certainly did not consider
vaccine production to be a serious business enterprise. Indeed, there were struc-
tural impediments to vaccine production even being a protable business.47
Moreover, there is no record of medical or physicians groups ever petitioning
or lobbying Congress.48 Because the production of vaccine was not a legitimate
business prospect the reluctance of state governments to get involved supports
both the public choice and business subsidy theses, but for the same reasons it
is dicult to explain the passage of the 1813 Act itself. Congress granted Smith
franking privilege without any political or nancial inducements. It is possible
that Congress in 1813 considered itself to have granted Dr. Smith a franchise'
similar to those given to road and bridge companies.49
I would emphasize again that the purpose of this paper is not to rigorously
apply the above historical theories. Instead, this Paper simply exposes discon-
tinuities between the theories and the history of the Vaccine Act, suggesting
lines of further study. The focus throughout this Paper is on getting the facts
right, i.e., thoroughly recounting the history of the Vaccine Act. Part II of
the paper provides some necessary historical background regarding the horrors
of smallpox, the breakthrough of vaccination, and the diculties encountered
in implementing vaccination in early 19th century America. In particular, the
problem of maintaining a steady supply of vaccine is described. Part III analyzes
the very limited role
' See infra Part HI. It should be noted that some local, i.e. municipal,
governments did make substantial eorts to encourage vaccination. See infra
text accompanying notes 186-191.
 See infra text accompanying notes 170-175. 48 See infra text accompanying
note 443.
9
13See infra text accompanying notes 280-28 1.
 See AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, Class 10 (MISC.), vol. 2, doc. 371
et. seq. (1834).
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assumed by state and local governments in the opening decades of the 19th
century. Part IV deals at length with the legislative history of the 1813 Act
itself including historical explanations for the Act and public opposition to Dr.
Smith. Part V discusses Congressional eorts between 1816 and 1820 to expand
the scope of the Vaccine Act. Part VI details the facts of the Tarboro Tragedy
and the analyzes the causes of the ensuing repeal of the Vaccine Act in 1822.
Part VII very briey recounts two later 19th century eorts to revive the idea
of a National Vaccine Institution. Part VIII contains a brief conclusion.
It should be noted that this paper places signicant reliance on the pub-
lished and unpublished documents of James Smith, the major proponent of the
Vaccine Act and the National Vaccine Agent because other sources of informa-
tion for these matters are scarce. There is little extant legislative history for
the Vaccine Act and related state and federal bills. Unlike the Constitutional
Convention and the rst Congresses, detailed records of Congressional debates
between 1810 and 1827 are not available. The Annals of Congress, a predecessor
to the Congressional Globe, provides little more than summaries of procedural
matters; detailed descriptions of debates are available only for extraordinary is-
sues. The select committees of the era did not hold public hearings, and the few
reports issues were generally quite perfunctory. Some legislative history can be
discerned from the memorials through which individuals often presented their
positions to Congress. Moreover, many House records were burned when the
capital was sacked by the British in 1814. The proceedings of state legisla-
tures of the era are even more dicult to locate.
One nal historical caveat: unlike modern Congressional practice, very few
bills were introduced in early Congresses and the majority were eventually en-
acted into law. In the
10
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14th Congress (1815-1817), for example, out of 465 measures introduced,
298 were passed. ' Similarly, in the 15th Congress (1817-1819) out of 507
measures introduced, 257 were enacted.52 Thus, the attention paid to unenacted
bills in these Congresses is not unwarranted. Any proposal which was actually
introduced into Congress in the early 19th century had a serious chance of
passage and was given due consideration.
II. Historical Background: Smallpox, the Discovery and Diculties of
Vaccination, and the Response of State and Local Govermnents
It is dicult today to appreciate the importance of smallpox vaccination in
the
early 19th century. Epidemic diseases, like smallpox, were not the peripheral
issues they are today; they were a central fact of early American life. Though
smallpox was not a leading cause of death, the virus struck with such ferocity
and killed so many, so quickly, and so painfully that for centuries the smallpox
virus was one of the most frightening predators of man.53 Smallpox was an
important concern of 19th century governments not just because of the fear it
aroused, but more importantly because smallpox deaths were preventable. In
1798 a safe, eective vaccine for smallpox was discovered; miraculously smallpox
had been conquered, at least in theory. Before vaccination could be eectively
implemented, however, a number of hurdles needed to be overcome: public
antipathy, the cost of vaccination, and, most importantly, the production of a
reliable supply of vaccine. Surprisingly, most states failed to enact measures to
ensure they reaped the benets of vaccination. The failure of state
' See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO
1970, at 1082 (series Y189,192) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS].
52 See id.
Smallpox might be compared to AIDS in this regard, drawing much more at-
tention than the mortality rates would predict because of the frightening nature
of the disease.
'4JAMES SMITH, PROSPECTUS OF A PERMANENT NATIONAL VAC-
CINE INSTITUTION 2 (1818) microformed on Early American Imprints, Sec-
ond Series, Fiche 45728 (Readex).
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governments provided the federal government with its rst signicant op-
portunity to save thousands of lives.
A. Smallpox: The King of Terrors
Though it was not the leading cause of death, smallpox aroused tremendous
fear among early Americans.55 Endemic diseases, i.e. diseases which continu-
ously aicted the population, like dysentery, typhus, scarlet fever, and particu-
larly tuberculosis (consumption), caused many more deaths than epidemic dis-
eases like smallpox.5' Nonetheless, because epidemic diseases dramatically swept
through cities without warning and quickly killed large numbers, they naturally
drew more public attention and alarm than deadlier endemic diseases.57 For
19th-century Americans living in towns or cities. .. re and epidemic disease
made up two up the most constant, catastrophic threats to safety and well-
being.58 In his excellent history of the public health of New York City, John
Duy notes that epidemic diseases were discussed at great length in newspapers,
medical journals and meetings of the municipal authorities.59 Epidemic diseases
were the only public health issue the federal government even addressed in the
early decades of the Republic.'0
For general history of smallpox and its eradication, the authoritative work
is FENNER ET AL., supra note 17. For a discussion of smallpox in America,
see id. at 209-244.
56 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 583-84 (death rates for New York City
from various causes 1800-1850).
 See id. at 446; SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 125 (Although the pestilential
diseases of cholera, smallpox,
and yellow fever were held in horror by the people, the real enemies which were
producing the
enormously high death rate caused little concern).
58 NOVAK, supra note 39, at 55.
 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 446.
60 See, e.g., supra statutes cited in note 31; Thomas Jeerson, Fifth Annual
Message to Congress (Dec. 3,
1805) in 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 11-12 (1805) (admonishing Congress to pay
attention to need the to possibly revise state health laws to combat epidemic
fevers); and, of course, the Vaccine Act of 1813 itself.
12
16Rohit Singla The Vaccine Act of 1813
Even among epidemic diseases smallpox was a distant third behind cholera
and yellow fever in its death toll. Nonetheless, smallpox incited a unique fear.
Smallpox was not conned to the lower classes like some epidemic diseases; it
was feared by wealthy and slum-dwellers alike.'2 Now that three generations
have passed since Americans suered from the disease, it is easy to forget that
smallpox was long called the King of Terrors.'3 Smallpox epidemics caused more
fear and social disruption than any other disease well into the 19th century.'4
The Pennsylvania Senate in 1809 summarized the prevailing opinion: smallpox
was universally acknowledged to be the most destructive plague that aects
mankind.'5
During the 18th century, smallpox rampaged through Europe and Amer-
ica. The New York Medical Society estimated that before the cow-pox vaccine
was discovered in 1798 forty thousand persons died annually... in Great Britain
and Ireland; that in twenty-ve years, Europe has lost fteen millions of in-
habitants... . Nor was the New World immune to the scourge of smallpox; if
anything the perception of Congress was that in America the natural Small Pox
had proved proportionably [sic] more destructive than in Europe.' Smallpox
ravaged cities like New York and Boston throughout the century.'8 According to
contemporary newspaper accounts, the smallpox epidemic of 1731 killed 5%-8%
of New York
See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 583-84; SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 118.
62 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 451.
' See id. at 57.
Susan Craddock, Sewers and Scapegoats: Spatial Metaphors of Smallpox in
19th Century San Francisco, 41
SOC. SCI & MED. 957 (1995) (commenting on San Francisco epidemics of
1868, 1876, 1881, and 1887).
65 20 J. OF SENATE OF PENN. 1809-1810, at 317 (1810) microformed on
Early American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 21023 (Readex).
MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON
THE EPIDEMIC SMALL Pox AND CHICKEN Pox 25 (1816) microfo,-med on
Early American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 38214 (Readex).
' Id. See also FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 238-240.
68 See, e.g., DUFFY, supra note 18, at 55-58 (smallpox mortality rates
throughout 18th century New York City); SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 24-30
(chronicling epidemics in Boston, New York, and Charlestown).
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City's population in three months.'9 In 1752, Boston lost 3.6% of its pop-
ulation in ve months.70 And, the Colonial Army suered even greater losses
during the War of Independence.7' Even if dysentery killed more people than
smallpox day-in and day-out, it is not surprising that people feared more a
disease which wiped out 5% of a city in the space of three months.
Though the practice of variolation72 had tamed some of the disease's ferocity,73
smallpox remained a major cause of death in 19th century. A House Committee
in 1822 claimed that 50,000 people died annually in Great Britain from small-
pox, twenty years after the discovery of vaccination.74 Dr. James Smith, the
National Vaccine Agent, noted that the number of deaths by Small Pox in the
United States.. . have always exceeded the number of persons imported from
other countries.75 Death rates during epidemics reached as high as ve
per thousand inhabitants in major cities. The Board of Health of Philadel-
phia reported 535 deaths from smallpox between 1807 and 1811, or over 100
deaths per year.7' The population of Philadelphia in 1810 was only S3,722,
so the smallpox mortality rate was about two per thousand. In Baltimore, Dr.
Smith reports that during the epidemic of 1812, one thousand
69 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 54.
70 See SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 27-28. Out of Boston's population of 15,684,
smallpox claimed 569. The death toll was even more frightening considering
that 50% of the population had increased immunity from variolation. For a
discussion of variolation, see infra text accompanying notes 97-103.
See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 239-240, 257.
72 See infra text accompanying notes 97-106 for distinction between variolation
and vaccination.
' See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 247.
' See H. REP. No. 17-48 (1822).
 SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 30. Immigration into the
United States in 1820 totaled 8385
persons. The population of the country at the time was 9,618,000. If the small-
pox mortality averaged at
least 0.9 per thousand, Smith's observation would be accurate. See HISTORI-
CAL STATISTICS, supra note
51, at 106 (series C89), 8 (series A7).
765ee VACCINE SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA, CONSTITUTION OF
THE VACCINE SOCIETY OF
PHILADELPHIA 4 (1813) microformed on Early American Imprints, Sec-
ond Series, Fiche 29504 (Readex).
See also, SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 15.
775ee THIRD CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1811). The county
of Philadelphia had an additional
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people were aicted with smallpox and 175 people died.78 Given Baltimore's
population of 35,583, the smallpox mortality rate was ve per thousand.
While these mortality rates are an order of magnitude less than in the 18th cen-
tury thanks to variolation and vaccination, smallpox remained a vicious killer.
The best smallpox mortality data for the ante-bellum United States is available
for New York City. During the rst eleven months of the 18 15-1816 epidemic,
293 people died in New York City.80 Seventeen deaths were reported the sec-
ond week of December 1815 alone.8' Given the city's population of perhaps
100,000,82 that translates to a death toll of almost three per thousand. To put
that gure in perspective, an pestilence with an equivalent mortality rate in
modern-day New York City would kill perhaps 30,000 people in a year. In the
epidemic of 1824 the death toll rose to 400 persons.83 Even in the absence of
major epidemics, annual death rates from smallpox in New York rarely dipped
below 0.5 deaths per 1000 inhabitants. Smallpox accounted for approximately
two percent of all fatalities in ante-bellum New York 84
Though the best data is available for cities like Philadelphia, New York, and
Baltimore, smallpox was a universal problem. During the 1808-18 11 epidemic
in Philadelphia, a committee of the Pennsylvania Senate reported that No part
of the state can be said to be
population of 57,488. See id. at 34.
78See JAMES SMITH, TWO LETrERS RELATIVE TO THE VACCINE
INSTITUTION 22(1818) microformed on
Early American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 45729 (Readex)
See TI-IIRD CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 53 (1811). The Eastern
and Western precincts of
Baltimore added 10,972 inhabitants, and the county of Baltimore had an
additional population of 29,255.
See id. at 53.
80 See MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK, supra
note 66, at 9.
81 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 248.
82 According to the THIRD CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (1811),
the population of New York City
in 1810 was 96,373.
83 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 248.
84 See id. at 249, 583-84. Duy provides average annual death rates and absolute
number of deaths from various diseases for ve year periods from 1804-1865.
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clear of the Small Pox; we hear of its annual devastation in almost every
county.85 Smith noted that smallpox was soon carried from port cities like New
York and Philadelphia onto the main roads and the publick houses on the high
roads leading to the westward.86 The Smallpox would eventually spread into
many other towns and seaports within the United States: from these again it
was. . . carried into the interior of the country.87 According to Dr. Smith, in
1817 smallpox was an alarming epidemic across a wide swath of the country|in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee.88
At mid-century, smallpox was still rampant. Major epidemics hit New York
City in the 1840's and 1850's with the death toll rising to 681 in 1853, or about
1.3 deaths per thousand inhabitants.89 A contemporary writer chronicles how
this most preventable of diseases spreads uncontrolled throughout our city.90
There were epidemics across the Eastern seaboard in late 19th century associ-
ated with waves of poor European immigrants. ' During the 1845-46 epidemic
in Baltimore, the death rates from smallpox reached 0.79 per 1000.92 Small-
pox epidemics were also common in frontier areas distant from the Eastern
seaboard.93 San Francisco, for example, suered from a series of four frighten-
ing epidemics in the two decades after the Civil War.94 As late as 1921, the
national incidence of smallpox reported was
85 20J. OF SENATE OF PENN. 1809-18 10, supra note 65, at 319.
86 SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 22.
87Id at 21.
88 Id. at 22-23.
89 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 448.
 STEPHEN SMITH, NEW YORK THE UNCLEAN (1865) excerpted in
MEDICAL AMERICA IN THE 19TH CENTURY 263, 271 (ed. Gert H. Bueger
1972).
' See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 240.
92 See GARY L. BROWNE, BALTIMORE IN THE NATION, 1789-1861,
at 200 (1980).
 See 13 CONG. REC. 862 (1882); SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 125.
 See Craddock, supra note 64. Curiously, Craddock's account of San Fran-
cisco's response to the epidemics makes no mention of vaccination campaigns
by city authorities like those which were common in Eastern cities. It is unclear
if this absence should be attributed to a lack of vaccine in San Francisco or an
oversight on Craddock's part.
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almost 1 per 1000 people, though death rates had greatly declined.95 It was
not until universal vaccination became widespread in the 1930's that smallpox
incidence rates were brought under control.9'
Tens of thousands of Americans lost their lives to smallpox in the 19th cen-
tury. And yet, after vaccination was introduced into the United States in 1801
every smallpox death was wholly preventable. Had early American governments
implemented comprehensive vaccination programs, the United States could have
conquered smallpox a century earlier.
B. The Discovery of Vaccination, the Greatest Single Triumph of Man
The importance of smallpox as an object of historical analysis is less due to
the deaths it caused, than to the discovery of vaccination. For the rst time
in human history, in 1798 man learned how to eradicate a virulent disease.
Early in the 18th century, Europeans nally learned how Asians and Africans
variolated for smallpox.97 The practice of variolation, called inoculation at the
time, was soon introduced into the United States by Cotton Mather in the
early 18th century.98 Variolation consisted of introducing a small amount of the
live smallpox virus into the arm of a healthy individual. The attenuated virus
produced a mild case of smallpox in the subject and granted increased immunity
against the disease. Variolation had two major drawbacks, however. Very rarely
the smallpox infection
 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 77 (series B304); FEN-
NER ET AL., supra note 17, at 328-32.
A milder strain of smallpox become dominant in the United States at the
turn of the century, and
mortality rates consequently declined sharply even though incidence rates re-
mained high. See id. It is
estimated that actual incidence at the turn of the century was at least ve
times as great as the reported
rate; as the disease became more mild, incidents of the disease often went un-
reported. See id, at 329.
' HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 77 (series B304); FENNER
ET AL., supra note 17, at 330-32. In
1922 the Supreme Court upheld mandatory vaccination requirements for school
attendance. SeeZucht v.
King, 260 U.S. 174, 43 S.Ct. 24 (1922).
For a history of variolation and its introduction to Europe, see FENNER
ET AL., supra note 17, at 252-
58.
98 For a detailed retelling of the storied exploits of Mather, see SMILLIE, supra
note 10, at 24-28.
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induced by variolation would actually kill the subject.99 More problemati-
cally, an inoculated individual was contagious, i.e., she could pass the smallpox
virus to others and start an epidemic herself.' Variolation with live small-
pox was such a problematic prophylactic treatment that its practice was often
strictly regulated. For example, Virginia enacted statutes in the late 18th cen-
tury which required the approval of a town's magistrates or one s neighbors be-
fore someone could be inoculated.'0' The threat posed by variolation was taken
very seriously; colonial Virginia imposed an extraordinary 1000L penalty for
an unapproved variolation.'2 Once the practice of vaccination was introduced,
most states banned variolation.'03
Given the great fear which smallpox caused and the problematic nature of
variolation, the discovery in 1798 of the cow-pox vaccine aroused enormous ex-
citement among doctors and municipal ocials.'04 In 1798, a now legendary
British physician, Dr. Edward Jenner, persuasively demonstrated that inocu-
lating humans with a bovine disease related to smallpox, cow-pox or kine-pox,
resulted in immunity to smallpox without the serious drawbacks of variolation.'5
Based on the medical term for the cow-pox virus,
Fatality rates from variolation are estimated at 0.5-2% compared to 20-30%
for full-blown smallpox. See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 246.
' See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 246; 20J. OF SENATE OF
PENN. 1809-1810, supra note 65, at 201;
SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 13; DUFFY,supra note 18, at 55.
'' See ROBERT H. HALSEY, HOW THE PRESIDENT, THOMAS JEF-
FERSON AND DOCTOR BENJAMIN
WATERHOUSE ESTABLISHED VACCINATION AS A PUBLIC HEALTH
PROCEDURE 33-34 (1936) (Libr. of
NY Acad. of Med., Hist. of Med. Series No. 5).
102 See id.
103 See, e.g., DUFFY, supra note 18, at 246-49, 448.
104 See, e.g., MASS. MEDICAL SOCIETY, REPORT ON VACCINATION
90 (1808) (on le with Harvard Medical School's Countway Rare Book Library)
(noting the high interest which this discovery [vaccination] excited in this coun-
try... engage[ing] the attention of almost every individual. .. in the medical
profession).
109 See SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 29-31; FENNER ETAL., supra note 17,
at 258-261. There has been debate over whether Jenner really was the rst to
discover the eectiveness of the cow-pox vaccine. SeeFENNER ET AL., supra
note 17, at 258, 264.
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vaccinia, the new treatment was dubbed vaccination.'06 The cow-pox virus
was closely enough related to the smallpox virus that inoculation with it granted
immunity to smallpox. But cow-pox did not cause a serious illness in humans,
and, more importantly, the cow-pox virus was not contagious in humans. Unlike
variolation, vaccination could not initiate deadly epidemics.
At the time the cow-pox virus was the only known safe and eective prophy-
lactic against any epidemic disease.'07 The British government awarded Jenner
the princely sum of $100,000 as a reward for his discovery.'08 With inoculations
for so many diseases widely available today, it is dicult to appreciate the im-
portance of the discovery of vaccination. The smallpox vaccine has been called,
with perhaps only slight exaggeration, the greate[st] single triumph of man in
his march toward civilization. ' The results of vaccination could be awesome.
As a result of wholeheartedly implementing a program of universal vaccination,
France's life expectancy at birth increased dramatically from 23 to 38 for men
and 27 to 41 for women between 1795 and 18171831.110
News of the great discovery spread rapidly throughout the world and reached
the States within a year. ' In 1800, Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse of Harvard
Medical School, America's Jenner, demonstrated it eectiveness to Americans.2
A tremendous amount of
106 See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1899 (1995). Vaccus is
Latin for cow.
107 Pasteur eventually applied the term to all kinds of inoculations. SeeFEN-
NER ET AL., supra note 17, at
258.
108 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 11.
109 SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 31.
110 See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 262. Fenner attributes the
increase to vaccination since
vaccination was the only public health measure of any importance at the time.
' See id. at 261-63.
112 See SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 30-3 1. Waterhouse experimented with
the vaccine on his own family and a group of orphans by rst giving them the
vaccine and then testing if a smallpox variolation would take.
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attention to vaccination immediately followed all across the country.3 By all
accounts, the second physician in the United States to begin regular vaccinations
was Dr. James Smith in Baltimore, the central gure in the history of the
Vaccine Act.4 James was a respected physician5 and was the attending physician
at the Baltimore Alms House.' In 1801, Dr. Smith received cow-pox virus from
an American merchant returning from Europe. Dr. Smith immediately began
vaccinating locals and propagating the vaccine.7
The advantages of vaccination over variolation were obvious,li and most
physicians immediately acknowledged the profound eectiveness of vaccination.
An unprecedented number of books and tracts regarding vaccination were pub-
lished in the opening decade of the 19th century.1i9 American policy makers
knew that many European countries had dramatically reduced smallpox deaths
within a decade of implementing ambitious vaccination programs.'20 It was of-
ten asserted that the discovery of the cow-pox vaccine would soon lead to the
total eradication of smallpox.'2' As William Pendergast notes in his history of
biologic drugs
 For a discussion of the encouragement given to vaccination in Virginia,
Washington DC, and Pennsylvania by Thomas Jeerson, see HALSEY,supra
note 101.
 See HALSEY, supra note 101, at 28. This should not be that surprising;
Baltimore had a well deserved reputation for innovation in public health and
medicine. SeeBROWNE, supra note 92, at 104.
 When smallpox threatened Baltimore, Smith was appointed by Mayor to the
Committee of Physicians. See Meeting of Pbysicians at the Mayor's Oce, 2
VACCINE INQUIRER 77 (1822), supra note 125.
'See JAMES SMITH, THE ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF THE LETTERS
OF HUMANITAS 43 (1801) microformed on Early American Imprints, Second
Series, Fiche 1332 (Readex).
 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 11; Adavit of James
Smith (May 15, 1826) in H.R. REP
NO. 19-95, at 5 (1827).
 See, e.g., MASS. MEDICAL SOCIETY, supra note 104, at 99.
 A search of Harvard University's library catalog reveals an incredible 197
texts regarding vaccination
published between 1800 and 1809 in Harvard's collection. Search of Harvard
On-Line Library
Information System (April 20, 1998) (search for KW vaccine or vaccination or
kine//yr= 180?).
120 See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 271-73.
121 See, e.g., BENJAMIN WATERHOUSE, A PROSPECT OF EXTERMI-
NATING THE SMALL Pox (1802) microformed on Early American Imprints,
Second Series, Fiche 3499 (Readex); GUTON G. JOHNSON, ANTE-BELLUM
NORTH CAROLINA 735 (1937); DUFFY, supra note 18, at 447.
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The signicance [of the discovery of smallpox vaccine] must not be dis-
counted, especially when we recall that most other drugs of the time were
crude vegetable preparations directed more at symptoms than at specic disease
conditions. That a widespread, lethal, epidemic disease could be prevented..,
must have struck those responsible for the welfare of whole populations as a
thunderbolt.'22
Vaccination, however, was not a self-implementing medical advance. Many
hurdles had to be
overcome before its value was fully realized. Unfortunately, American gov-
ernments failed to adequately address these hurdles for decades.
C Impediments to Implementing Vaccination
Despite the discovery of smallpox vaccination at the dawn of the century, it
was not until the end of the century that smallpox mortality in the United States
was brought under control. 123 There were a number of basic impediments to
the eective implementation of vaccination: public opposition, the expense of
vaccination, and the lack of a reliable supply of cow-pox vaccine. Until these
problems were overcome, thousands would continue to die of smallpox. While
vaccination rates in some major cities were quite high,'24 vaccination spread
very slowly through the rest of the country. In 1822, vaccination rates in coastal
North Carolina were estimated at around 1%.iOs
1. Public Skepticism
Though the consensus among physicians and policy makers recognized the
great value of vaccination, there was signicant ambivalence and even hostility
towards vaccination
122 Pendergast, supra note 24, at 305.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 89-96.
124 James Smith eventually had to send an agent into Pennsylvania to nd
healthy, unvaccinated
individuals after depleting the supply in Baltimore and the surrounding counties
of Maryland. See infra
text accompanying note 165.
125 See Open Letter from Dr. Ward (Feb. 7, 1822) reprinted in 3 VACCINE
INQUIRER 136, 140
(1822) microlmed on American Periodical Series, 1800-1850, Reel 246 (Uni-
versity Microlms).
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among the populace.'2' As late as 1822, there was a proposal in Congress
to have a select committee consider whether there is any reasonable doubt of
the ecacy of vaccination in response to the skepticism of the public.'27 Indeed
Congressmen worried that investigation into the facts of Tarboro Tragedy itself
would only lend credence to people. . . who went about preaching [against
vaccination] and that old fashioned small pox [i.e., variolation] was the only
thing.'28
Part of the opposition to vaccination resulted from a well-founded skep-
ticism of the largely ineective or even dangerous practices which passed for
medicine in ante-bellum America.i29 The dangers and distrust associated with
the practice of variolation were also naturally imputed to the closely related
practice of vaccination. Some clergy felt that vaccination interfer[ed] with the
will of God by preventing smallpox from taking its natural course and smiting
the unworthy.'30 Moreover, there was understandable widespread opposition to
injecting uids derived from diseased cows into healthy humans.'3' It seemed un-
natural, sacrilegious, and down-right dangerous. IIP]opular cartoons depicted
people growing horns or tails after being vaccinated.'32 This ambivalence com-
bined with a general sense of security and carelessness in the years between
epidemics, lead people to ignore vaccination until a smallpox epidemic actually
struck.'
126 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 447-48.
127 See 38 ANNALS. OF CONG. 853-54 (1822).
128 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1638 (1822)
129 See JOHNSON, supra note 121, at 749-63 for a detailed description of
medicine in the ante-bellum South.
130 FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 267.
'' Id. at 267.
132 Id.
 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 247-48; SMITH, PROSPECTUS,supra
note 54, at 27-28; MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK,
supra note 66, at 24-25.
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Finally, commercial interests often blocked vaccination eorts. When cases
of smallpox rst arose in a city, health ocials attempted to publicize the
imminent epidemic to encourage the otherwise neglected practice of vaccina-
tion. Merchants used their growing political power to oppose announcements
of epidemics.'34 Merchants feared business would be hurt by the resulting panic
and mass exodus from the city. Governments thus had the opportunity to save
lives by entering the debate over vaccination. By endorsing the safety and ef-
cacy of vaccination and encouraging municipalities to ignore pressure from
merchants, legislatures could help overcome public antipathy. By and large,
legislatures were happy to oblige as long as they did not have to spend state
funds.
2. The High Cost of Vaccination
Even for those willing to undergo vaccination, the cost of vaccination was
often
prohibitive for the poor. In 1816, physicians in New York were charging
$5-S 10 for vaccinations plus an additional $5 charge for a house visit during
an epidemic.'35 Costs were similar in other parts of the country.'3' Adjusted for
ination, vaccination cost households $50-s 100 per family member.'37 Without
any form of health insurance, vaccination was simply
See SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 21. Smith claims that in
1821, even the consulting physician to the Baltimore Board of Health concealed
a smallpox outbreak to prevent alarm, or to serve, perhaps, the mercantile
interests.... Letter from James Smith to Senator Lloyd (Apr. 25, 1822) appended
to H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822). The political power of merchants in major cities
should not be underestimated. For example, fully one-third of city council
members in Baltimore between 1797 and 1815 were merchants. See BROWNE,
supra note 92, at 44-45.
'35 See LIST OF MEDICAL AND SURGICAL CHARGES ESTABLISHED
BY THE ASSOCIATED PHYSICIANS AND
SURGEONS OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK (1816) microformed on Early
American Imprints, Second Series,
Fiche 38213 (Readex) [hereinafter LIST OF MEDICAL AND SURGICAL CHARGES].
136 For example, in 1800 a physician in North Carolina charged $8 for small-
pox variolations. See JOHNSON, supra note 121, 734-735 (1937). Presumably
he charged a similar price in later years for vaccinations, which involved an
identical procedure.
 The amounts are in 1996 dollars. The ination deator is taken from
Robert Sahr, Consumer Price Index Conversion Factors to Convert to 1996 Dol-
lars (last modied Apr. 8, 1996) <http://www.orst.edu/Dept/poli sci/sahr/cpi96.html>
[hereinafter CPI Conversion Factors 1996] which are in turn based on HISTOR-
ICAL STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 210-11 (Series E135) and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index. Estimating the present value of prices
from the early 19th century is very problematic. See id., at 190-92. The amounts
given here should be taken as rough
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unaordable for many faniilies. This was simply too much for many families
to spend on a prevention measure that they doubted in any case. It should not
be surprising that vaccination was observed only when the threat of smallpox
was imminent.
There is some evidence to suggest that the high cost of vaccination was
due to the monopoly physicians enjoyed on performing vaccinations. The Town
of Milton charged only 25 cents for vaccinations when it established a town
sponsored clinic in 1809. 138 It appears the Town simply obtained the services
of physicians gratis, but it is possible that the Town also directly subsidized the
costs of vaccinations.'39 In 1812, the New York Kine-Pox Dispensary vaccinated
1658 indigents on a total budget of $1,275.56, or about 75 cents per
There appeared, thus, to be much room for government subsidies to make
vaccination more aordable for middle-class Americans. Legislatures in the
early 19th century almost uniformly refused, however, to subsidize vaccination.
3. Maintaining a Reliable Vaccine Supply and the Need for Vaccine Insti-
tutions The most signicant obstacle to eective vaccination was the diculty
of
obtaining pure, uncontaminated vaccine when an epidemic threatened. Vac-
cine was dicult to produce in mass quantities, could only be stored for a
short time, and was easily contaminated. For vaccination to be eectively im-
plemented it was necessary that charitable or government supported vaccine
institutions be established to maintain a reliable supply of vaccine. These insti-
tutions could both propagate the vaccine supply in the years between epidemics
and ensure that the vaccine supply was not inert or contaminated with other
viruses. The absence
estimates.
l38 See infra text accompanying notes 187-191.
See infra text accompanying note 190.
 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 247. Similar costs were reported for vacci-
nation eorts in 1816.
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of a continuous source of genuine, uncontaminated vaccine was a major im-
pediment to vaccination in the 19th century.
Many commentators in the early 19th century bemoaned the diculty of
procuring the pure vaccine and perpetuating it has ever been the greatest im-
pediment to the practice of vaccination.'4' Despite charitable vaccine institu-
tions in major urban areas,'42 it appears that vaccine was not readily available
throughout country.'43 During the War of 1812, the Army urgently requested
the recently appointed National Vaccine Agent, James Smith, to supply vaccine
to the Northern, Northwestern, and Western Armies.' After the war had ended,
the Army continued to ask Dr. Smith for supplies of vaccine. In one 1816 letter,
the Surgeon General of the Army requested vaccine for twenty-three forts and
regiments from Boston to New Orleans.'45 After the Army adopted compulsory
vaccination in 1818, '' its need for a steady supply of vaccine only increased.
After Congress refused to compensate James Smith for the vaccine he supplied
the military, the Army quickly paid the amount Smith demanded to ensure a
continued supply of vaccine.'47 The diculty of obtaining reliable
' SYLVANUS FANSHER, MEMORIAL, SEN. DOC. NO. 25-385, at 2 (1838).
See also, 20J. OF SENATE OF PENN. 1809-1810, supra note 65, at 316.
142 See infra text accompanying notes 176, 233-236.
Critics of Smith's eorts often asserted that there was no shortage of gen-
uine vaccine. See, e.g., SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 32 (citing
critics); MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE COUNTY OF NEW YORK, supra
note 66, at 16 (denying Smith's assertions that the want of 'genuine vaccine
matter is the only serious diculty' to promoting vaccination). See also MASS.
MEDICAL SOCIETY, supra note 104, which makes no mention of the problem
of obtaining reliable vaccine. The Massachusetts Medical Society was instead
concerned with public doubts of the vaccine's ecacy. There probably was no
shortages in Boston and New York and the other major cities in which these
medical societies were located.
'See Letter from Francis Le Barron, Surgeon U.S. Army, to Dr. James Smith
(Apr. 12, 1813) copy appended to James Smith, Report of the Vaccine Institu-
tion to Congress (1821) (on le with the National Archives: Senate Documents,
Box 16A-K5, 'Document About Vaccine Institution).
'See Letter from Francis Le Barron, Surgeon U.S. Army, to Dr. James Smith
(Nov. 5, 1816) copy appended to Smith, Report, supra note 144.
'' See Letter from Jos. Lovell, Surgeon General, U.S. Army, to James Barbous,
Secretary of War (Feb. II, 1826), HR. DOC. No. 19-90 (1826).
 See infra Part V.C.
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supplies of vaccine continued throughout the 19th century.'48 The inattention
given vaccination until an epidemic struck only exacerbated the problem. Years
would pass with little to no local demand for the vaccine and then an epidemic
would suddenly trigger a tremendous demand. Smallpox vaccine was often so
dicult to obtain during epidemics that the dangerous practice of variolation
with the live smallpox virus continued well into the 19th century.'49 The practice
of variolation, of course, only increased the danger of an epidemic.'50
Maintaining a supply of pure, uncontaminated vaccine was no easy matter.
No method of articially producing the vaccine was known to 19th century
physicians. The original cow-pox virus is a rare disease in cows' which was
long thought to be not indigenous to the United States.'52 Luckily, the cow-pox
virus is hardy enough that it can be dried and preserved for a short time on
silver or ivory quills or on glass slides.'53 Samples of vaccine could be imported
from England by ship'54 and be distributed eciently around the country
through the mail.'55 However, the dried cow-pox virus can only be preserved
for perhaps 30 to
148 See infra Part VII.
 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 248; JAMES SMITH, MEMORiAL 6 (1816)
microformed on Early American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 38948 (Readex)
[hereinafter SMITH, 1816 MEMORIAL].
hO See supra text accompanying notes 100-103.
'' See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 265.
152 See 20J. OF SENATE OF PENN. 1809.1810, supra note 65, at 315;
MEMORIAL FROM BOARD OF MANAGERS OF PROPOSED NATIONAL
VACCINE INSTITUTION, H. DOC. NO. 16-29 at 2(1820) [hereinafter BOARD
OF MANGERS]. (Passages of this latter document are copied directly from
SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, so James Smith is the document's
likely author.) But SeeFANSHER, supra note 141, at 7 (not generally known
that cow-pox is sometimes happily found among the cows in Connecticut and
neighboring states).
 See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 263.
154 See, e.g., SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 30-3 1 (describing Waterhouse receiv-
ing original vaccine virus from
Jenner in England); SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 11 (describing
receiving original vaccine from
London).
155 The postal system appears to have been reasonably ecient. For example,
letters between James Smith
in Baltimore and Francis Le Barron in Philadelphia appear to have been
regularly delivered within two days even during the War of 1812. See letters
appended to SMITH, REPORT, supra note 144.
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90 days,'5' after which the virus was rendered inert, or spurious. The live
virus needed to be propagated in the United States to maintain a long-term
indigenous supply.
The only known method of propagating the cow-pox virus over long periods
was through a succession of human subjects.'57 (For some unexplained reason,
the obvious trick of propagating the virus by articially infecting a succession of
cows did not begin in the United States until after 1870.') Physicians quickly
learned that live cow-pox virus could be harvested from the infected pustule of
a vaccinated person eight days after vaccination.'59 This harvested virus could
be dried for future use or immediately used to vaccinate others. This method
of arm-to-arm propagation was so important that numerous medical manuals
were printed which described the procedure in great detail.i'0 Through a con-
stant stream of subjects, the virus could be propagated indenitely over the
years. Every eight days the virus was harvested from someone vaccinated the
previous week and inserted into a new unvaccinated patient. Dr. Smith propa-
gated a sample of virus received from England for more than 20 years through
such arm-to-arm transmission.' Other physicians also reported maintaining a
single sample of vaccine for decades.2 Of course, in the absence of an epidemic
it was no easy matter to maintain a steady supply of healthy, unvaccinated sub-
jects, year after year, particularly in cities like Baltimore with a long history of
vaccination.3 Convincing
'' See John Cromwell, et. al., Physician's Certicate in SMITH, PROSPEC-
TUS, supra note 54, at 9. ' See SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 125.
'' See id.; FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 265-67. However, as early as
1801, Waterhouse experimented with inoculating cows with cow-pox taken from
vaccinated humans and then collecting vaccine from the cows. See HALSEY,
supra note 101, at 17.
 See SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 31.
160 One of the most prominent was VALENTINE SEAMAN, A DISCOURSE
UPON VACCINATION (1816) microformed on Early American Imprints, Sec-
ond Series, Fiche 38906 (Readex). SeeDUFFY, supra note 18, at 245-46 for a
description of Seaman's role in promoting vaccination in New York City.
' See Adavit of James Smith (May 15, 1826) in H.R. REP No. 19-95, at
5 (1827). 162 See, e.g., FANSHER, supra note 141, at 2.
3 See SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 15.
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them in the absence of a threatening epidemic to submit to vaccination
and return eight days later to pass on the virus was even more dicult. Dr.
Smith found it a very troublesome business to prevail on families to submit
to vaccination in the absence of an epidemic.4 Smith eventually resorted to
sending a trained agent into Pennsylvania where smallpox was more widespread
and vaccination less common to vaccinate people and propagate the virus.165
Needless to say, maintaining a steady supply of vaccine for decades was a major
undertaking.
Though it was the only known method of propagating the virus, arm-to-arm
transmission was a risky business. Indiscriminate arm-to-arm transmission often
resulted in the transmission of other diseases the patients were carrying.' The
accidental transmission of syphilis was particularly common. Physicians needed
to ensure that they harvested vaccine from patients free of other infectious
diseases, lest people nd another reason to fear vaccination,7 yet physicians
were surprisingly careless about harvesting vaccine from individuals infected
with other diseases. Even more problematically, laypersons and even physicians
would mistake related infections for the cow-pox virus. They would use arm-to-
arm transmission to pass dangerous infections to others in the mistaken belief
that they were vaccinating for smallpox.8 Both physicians and laypersons were
also wont to perform arm-to-arm transmission after the virus in the pustule
had expired and been rendered inert.9 Without medical follow-up, the patient
mistakenly believed she was protected from smallpox. These problems with
arm-to-arm transmission counseled for a central source of vaccine which was
known to be uncontaminated and eective. Even during epidemics, when there
was no
'Id. at 31.
165 See id. at 32.
' See SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 125.
167 See id.
168 See SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 4; BOARD OF MAN-
AGERS, supra note 152, at 4-5. See H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822); Spurious
Vaccination, 1 VACCINE INQUIRER 38(1822), supra note 125.
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shortage of willing subjects, a trustworthy original source for vaccine was
still needed. These problems also indicated the care with which vaccine needed
to be propagated over the years.
The obvious solution was to establish vaccine institutions dedicated to pre-
serving a supply of vaccine through regular arm-to-arm transmissions between
healthy individuals. Unfortunately, these vaccine factories depended on either
charitable or government support; they could not be protable businesses. There
was a simple structural impediment to the production of vaccine by the private
sector. Without compulsory vaccination, the demand for the vaccine was highly
sporadic. Years of very low demand were followed by short periods of very
high demand. Large investments were necessary to maintain the vaccine supply
during these long periods of low-demand, but these investments could not be re-
covered during a period of high demand. During an epidemic local entrepreneurs
could obtain a single sample of vaccine from any existing manufacturer and eas-
ily produce an innite supply of vaccine through arm-to-arm transmission.'70
The price of vaccine would be forced to the very low cost of production, and the
manufacturer would be unable to recoup its up|front investment.
Private enterprise could protably produce vaccine if producers were granted
monopolies; however, the tenor of the time prevented a grant of a monopoly over
such an important medical breakthrough. Very early Benjamin Waterhouse
emphatically rejected the
170 The entrepreneur's supply might be contaminated with syphilis or be
otherwise untrustworthy. However, without clear branding it was dicult for
consumers to respond to the potential quality dierences. Moreover, skilled
physicians could certainly establish quality-controlled supplies during an epi-
demic; they might even feel ethically obligated to maintain such supplies.
'' In this sense, vaccine production had an economic structure akin to the
production of intellectual property. The economic structure of vaccine pro-
duction explains Smith's demand that subscribers to his Institution not share
the vaccine they receive from him with other physicians and his proposal to
tax vaccinations. See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 5-6 (limit-
ing subscribers from distributing vaccine); JAMES SMITH, THE NATIONAL
VACCINE INSTITUTION 1 (1822) (on le with Countway Rare Books: Pam-
phlets on Small-pox, No. 6) (same); infra text accompanying notes 329-33 1
(tax proposal).
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idea of production monopolies,'72 and the very suggestion that the Vac-
cine Act granted Dr. Smith a monopoly aroused vocal criticism of the 1813
Act.'73 Besides, private enterprises would face perverse incentives to maximize
business by ensuring that smallpox remained epidemic. The extermination of
smallpox would obviously not be in the best interest of a prot-maximizing
vaccine producer. Even though universal vaccination would be favored by a
private producer, in a nation which neglected vaccination until an epidemic
was imminent,'74 a prot-maximizing producer would want regular epidemics
to encourage the sale of vaccine. This eect was recognized by people at the
time. When Dr. Smith accidentally mailed live smallpox instead of cow-pox
to a physician in North Carolina causing a minor epidemic, there were accusa-
tions that the physicians had purposely instigated an epidemic to increase their
sales.'3
In addition to publicly endorsing vaccination and subsidizing the vaccina-
tion of the poor, American governments were presented with the opportunity to
establish vaccine institutions to maintain a reliable, genuine supply of vaccine.
Reliable sources of vaccine were a sine qua non of successfully implementing
vaccination, yet state governments and the federal government refused to do
anything which would draw upon public coers. While governments were happy
to endorse vaccination, they would not spend money to subsidize the distribu-
tion or production of vaccine. The reaction of state and local governments is
discussed in Part D below; the remainder of the Paper analyzes the eorts of
the national government.
172 See, HALSEY, supra note 101, at 57.
'i See infra Part IV.D.
'' See supra Part II.C.1-2.
 See infra text accompanying notes 409, 436.
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III. State and Local Governments: The Reluctance to Allocate Funds
In the largest cities, such as New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, charita-
ble Vaccine Institutions were established to provide for vaccination of the poor
and maintain a local supply of vaccine.'7' In other areas, individual physicians
and private citizens attempted to promote vaccination on their own.'77 Antebel-
lum state and local governments, however, failed to respond to the opportunity
provided by the discovery of vaccine. The reaction of state governments throws
doubt on Novak's salus populi thesis and on federalism explanations for the
inactivity of the central 
Admittedly, American political institutions were not developed enough to
pursue the most eective and obvious solution, compulsory vaccination.'79 Amer-
icans were aware
that in the rst decade of the 19th century a number of European countries
successfully implemented compulsory vaccination programs to dramatic eect,
but even politicians inclined to support vaccination recognized that compulsory
vaccination was not an option in ante-bellum America.'80 American norms of
liberty and limited government would not allow
 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 245-49 (New York); VACCINE SOCIETY
OF PHILADELPHIA, supra note 76; SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54,
at 12-13 (Baltimore). These organizations usually consisted of informal, un-
incorporated groups of physicians backed by wealthy benefactors. New York
Kine-Pock Institution, for example, was formed at a meeting of physicians at
the Tontine Coee-House and operated out of a lower-eastside apartment before
being absorbed by the larger New York Public Dispensary. See CONSTITU-
TION OF NEW YORK VACCINE INSTITUTE (1802), microformed on Early
American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 2789 (Readex); DUFFY,supra note 18,
at 245.
' See, e.g., FANSHER, supra note 141 (Connecticut physician promoting vac-
cination since 1808);
HALSEY, supra note 101 (eorts of Thomas Jeerson to promote vaccination
in Virginia and Washington
DC).
78 See supra note 39 for description of the salus populi thesis. See supra
note 40 for description of federalism explanations.
It is possible that some localities may have adopted something close to
mandatory vaccination programs during outbreaks. See, e.g., H. REP. No.
20-215, at 2-3 (1828) (after outbreak of smallpox, a very general vaccination
has be resorted to in Washington, D.C.); Letter from Committee of Physicians
to Mayor of Baltimore (1821) in 2 VACCINE INQUIRER 80-81 (1822), supra
note 125 (instructing district ocials to seek out all unvaccinated poor and re-
port the same for vaccination).
See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822) (after listing dramatic aects of compulsory
vaccination in Europe, no recommendation of such a program in the United
States); 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1637 (after discussing successes in Europe,
Representative Condict noted that under our free Government, no
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for such intrusion into personal life. When compulsory vaccination was rst
seriously considered at the turn of the century it was widely opposed, even by
some physicians, as an invasion of personal liberty.' The United States Army
was one of the few ante-bellum institutions to adopt compulsory vaccination.2
While states can thus be excused for not exercising their police powers to re-
quire compulsory vaccination, state government refusal to appropriate money to
subsidize the production of vaccine or the vaccination of the poor is a mystery.
Despite the serious public debate over the ecacy and morality of vaccination,3
state legislatures and ocials were quick to wholeheartedly endorse vaccination
as a safe and eective procedure and exhort citizens to submit to vaccination.4
But even though vaccination clearly had large externality benets, i.e., the to-
tal benet to society of vaccinating an individual exceeded the benets to that
individual, ante-bellum state governments repeatedly declined to provide any
funding for vaccination. The refusal of state governments can not be explained
by any of the ve historical explanations for the inactivity of 19th century
governments.5
compulsory measures can be resorted to).
111 See, e.g., articles in the New York Medico-Legal Journal such as Matilda
Morehouse, Compulsory
Vaccination and Its Errors, 13 MEDICo-LEGALJ. 303 (1896); Montague R.
Leverson, Vaccination. Should
it Be Enforced by Law?, 14 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 270 (1896). For a contem-
poraneous description of the
response by courts to compulsory vaccination laws, see Compulsory Vaccination,
SLAW NOTES (N.Y.)
405 (Dec. 1904).
Compulsory vaccination of the Army began in 1818. See H. DOC. No. 19-90
(1826). The Navy appointed a surgeon in 1816 to visit all ports and vaccinate
all seamen, Naval or otherwise. But in the 1820's, the Navy did not see t to
encourage vaccination since the Navy thought that smallpox was uncommon
among its ships. See Letter from Samuel Southard to House of Representatives
(Mar. 8, 1826) AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, Class 6 (NAVAL AFFAIRS), vol.
2, doc. 301 (1860). But seeFANSHER, supra note 141, at 1 (smallpox ravaging
Navy ships in 1830's: 'United States ships of war have most distressingly been
converted into small pox hospitals).
183 See supra Part II.C.1.
See, e.g., THE COW-POX ACT 3-4 (1810) microformed on Early American
Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 20667 (Readex).
185 See supra notes 36-40.
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Municipal governments sometimes funded vaccination during epidemics. For
example, the city of New York provided $1000 during the epidemic of 1815 to
the New York Vaccine Institute for free vaccination of the poor.' In July of
1809, after smallpox had entered Boston, the town of Milton organized the rst
government sponsored vaccination clinic in the United States.7 The Selectmen
vaccinated a quarter of the town, 337 people, in three days|with few exceptions,
all that were liable to the Small Pox.' Townspeople were charged only 25 cents
for vaccination. ' The town might have appropriated funds to subsidize the
cost of vaccination, but certainly obtained the free services of physicians.'90
The Selectmen of Milton were so excited at their success that they convinced
fourteen neighboring towns to undertake similar programs.'9'
The Selectman of Milton, however, soon realized that their means were un-
equal to their wishes and that assistance from the state government would be
required to achieve universal vaccination in Massachusetts.'92 The Selectmen pe-
titioned the governor and the legislature in January 1810 to appropriate funds to
establish a comprehensive vaccination program and establish a general organi-
zation to encourage vaccination.193 This general organization would presumably
maintain a vaccine supply at distribute it at government expense. The Select-
men also asked the state to mandate local governments to provide
186 See DUFFY, supra note 18, at 248.
 See THE COW-POX ACT, supra note 184, at 1; SMILLIE, supra note
10, at 31.
188 See THE COW-POX ACT, supra note 184, at 1. Presumably this meant
all those who had not been
previously inoculated, vaccinated, or survived smallpox.
189 See SMILLIE, supra note 10, at 31.
' The Act which was eventually enacted empowered local governments to
raise money for vaccination. See infra text accompanying note 195.
'' See THE COW-POX ACT, supra note 184, at 1.
192 Id. at 2.
199 See id.
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vaccination clinics.'94 The Massachusetts legislature responded with a short
Act which simply sanctioned vaccination and authorized towns to raise money
to pay for vaccination if they wished. ' Massachusetts atly declined to appro-
priate funds to established any general organization and ensure that a steady
supply of vaccine was available in the state. While the legislature quickly agreed
to ocially endorse vaccination, they simply did not want to spend any money
on vaccination.
Massachusetts' sister states were just as reluctant to spend money on vacci-
nation.
In 1816, a bill was introduced in the New York legislature which would have
established a New York State Vaccine Institute in Albany and appropriated
$1000 annually to fund the institute. i96 The Institute would have provided
free vaccination for the poor, maintained a constant supply of vaccine, and
distributed the same freely to physicians in the state.'97 The legislature failed
to pass the Act even though the state was in the middle of an epidemic.'9' A
similar Act was rejected by the legislature the following year even though the
compensation had been reduced to
Before eventually approaching Congress, James Smith rst lobbied the leg-
islatures of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia for the funds to maintain his
Vaccine Institution. In
return he oered to distribute vaccine without charge to the citizens of those
states. When he approached the Maryland legislature in 1809 smallpox was
occasioning a serious mortality in
'' See id.
'See id. at 7.
'' Act for Establishing the New-York Vaccine Institution  1, 2 (1816)
microformedon Early American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 38419 (Readex).
' See id  3. The bill also would have authorized the Vaccine Institute
to build a medical library, laboratory, and museum and award prizes for the
best annual dissection. See id. x 5. The original bill had an unexplained provi-
sion which prohibited vaccination by any other physician in Albany, essentially
granting the Albany Institute a local monopoly. See id.  6.
' See supra text accompanying notes 80-8 1.
'' Act for Establishing the New-York Vaccine Institution (1817) micro-
formed on Early American
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many parts of the state.2 The House of Delegates passed a measure which
allocated the $1000 annual emolument Smith had requested, but the Maryland
Senate rejected the amount as too much.20' At the next session, Smith requested
just $1000 for three years and the permission to institute a lottery to raise addi-
tional funds for his Vaccine Institution.202 The Maryland legislature declined to
allocate any money directly from the treasury but did agree to authorize Smith
to institute a $30,000 lottery to fund his vaccine institution for six years.203 In
exchange, the legislature required Smith to provide vaccine freely to all citizens
of Maryland for six years whether the lottery was successful or not. Though the
state refused to provide direct funding, the authorization for the lottery was not
a trivial grant. Such lotteries had a quasi-public nature, and adjusted for ina-
tion the lottery could have yielded $300,000 in 1996 dollars.204 Unfortunately
at the same session, the Maryland legislature also authorized a
$100,000 lottery to raise money for a monument to President Washington.205
Needless to say, Smith's vaccine lottery could not compete for support with a
lottery to memorialize the Father of the Country. The second lottery also had a
much larger, more attractive purse. After many eorts, a reorganization of the
lottery, and insuring the lottery with a mortgage




his institution and the free distribution of vaccine. wice the amount pro-
posed in
the 1809 bill, but Smith did have to undertake signicant eorts and risk to
institute a successful lottery. Smith points out that this was the only case he
knew of where a state had
Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 41611 (Readex).
200 SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 3.
201 See id. at 5.
202 See id. at 5-6.
203 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 17.
204 See CPI Conversion Factors 1996, supra note 137.
205 See SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 8.
206 See id. at 9-11.
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obligated a citizen to provide a service to the state but placed his compensa-
tion at the hazard of lottery.207 Nonetheless, in 1816 Smith asked that the law
be renewed and another lottery authorized, but the legislature declined.20'
The legislature of Pennsylvania was even less forthcoming. After providing
vaccine to counties of Pennsylvania close to Baltimore, Smith petitioned the
Pennsylvania Legislature in 1809 to support his eorts.209 Smith traveled from
Baltimore to Lancaster to lobby the legislature in person and provided them
with numerous reports. 210 Smith asked for $1000 annually in exchange for free
distribution of vaccine to the entire state. 2i1 Pennsylvania was in the midst of
an epidemic,212 and a Pennsylvania Senate committee assert[ed] that there have
been more deaths within the last two or three years in this state by the small-pox,
than in all the [rest of the] United States combined.2'3 The committee blamed
our having made no exertions to overcome the prejudices and neglect of our
citizens.214 The committee thus reported on Smith's proposal quite favorably:
[S]hall we refuse to supply our citizens, with the simple, cheap and invalu-
able means of preservation, from a most loathsome and destructive disease?. ..
nothing else seems to be necessary than a supply of pure and genuine Vaccine
Matter... Dr. Smith's plan appear to be the most competent, to attain the
great object of a general security from Small Pox, of any which has been yet
suggested.215
207 Id. (emphasis in original).
208 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 26.
209 His petition to the Pennsylvania legislature initially seems to request just
permission to sell the
Maryland lottery tickets in Pennsylvania. This proposal is never mentioned
by Smith or the legislature again. See 201. OF SENATE OF PENN. 1809-1810,
supra note 65, at 203.
210 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 18-19.
211 See id.
212 See supra text accompanying note 76.
213 201. OF SENATE OF PENN. 1809-1810, supra note 65, at 318-19.
215 Quoted in SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 19. But see 201.
OF SENATE OF PENN. 1809-18 10, supra note 65, at 318-19 (slightly dierent
text).
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The committee recommended an annual emolument to Smith and nancial
support for additional vaccine institutions in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia to
ensure that the entire state was adequately covered.2 According to Smith, the
bill which was eventually introduced, however, only provided support for one
institution in Pennsylvania and no funding for Smith.217 The bill passed the
Pennsylvania House but was defeated in the Senate 14 to 12.
Despite the toll smallpox was taking on its citizens, the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture, like Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland, refused to spend any money
to provide vaccine for its citizens.21'
A group of private citizens in North Carolina also petitioned their legisla-
ture to appropriate funds to contract with Dr. Smith for free distribution of
vaccine.219 But, the North Carolina legislature 'taking into consideration the
low state of our nancial aairs,' refused to make such a use of public funds.220
Virginia was the only state government in this period which allocated funds
to provide for vaccination.22' In 1813, the Virginia legislature agreed in principle
to provide $600 annually to Dr. Smith to support his free distribution of vaccine
in Virginia.2 However, Virginia required Dr. Smith to travel to the state capital
every year to renew his appointment,
216 Of course, with institutions in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, very little of
the state would have found
Baltimore a more convenient location from which to obtain vaccine. Perhaps
this is the source of the
animus with which Smith viewed the Committee's proposal. See SMITH,
PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at
18.
217 Perhaps in anger, Smith notes years later that he was informed at the
time that the Pennsylvania
citizen to be put in charge of the Pennsylvania Institution was in no way
competent.Id.
218 A charitably funded vaccine institution was formed in Philadelphia in 1813.
SeeVACCINE SOCIETY OF
PHILADELPHIA, supra note 76.
219 It is not clear what role, if any, Dr. Smith played in organizing North
Carolina citizens to petition
their legislature.
220 JOHNSON, supra note 121, at 736.
221 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 20-21.
222 See An Act for the Free Distribution of Genuine Vaccine Matter, 1814
Va. Acts ch. 14, 3.
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and come to Richmond every six months to collect his payments.223 The
expense of constantly traveling to Richmond from Baltimore was often not worth
the meager $300 oered, so Dr. Smith missed many trips and many payments.224
Dr. Smith only managed to receive about $1500 over the next four years.225
In 1818, Dr. Smith decided the it was not worth the eort and abandoned the
Virginia plan altogether.22'
The behavior of these state governments is at least puzzling. The wealthiest
and most prominent states in the Union|Massachusetts, New York, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and
North Carolina|refused to appropriate $1000 annually to provide vaccine
for their citizens even though they endorsed vaccination itself.227 Perhaps pure
smallpox vaccine was not as hard to come by as it appears. But the states were
in the midst of epidemics when they were petitioned, and the epidemics were
inevitably the result of inadequate vaccination. Moreover, the legislatures all
seem to agree that there was a need for a reliable vaccine supply. No one argued
that vaccine institutions were unnecessary. The only articulated opposition was
that the amounts requested were too great. But the states were being asked for
relatively modest
annual sums, $10,000 - $20,000 in 1996 dollars.22' None of the standard
historical explanations
29
seems to adequately explain the parsimony of state governments.
Certainly the state governments were not acting in the spirit of Novak's salus
populi thesis; the governments were not viewing the health of the people as
the supreme law. Federalism concerns are inapplicable to state governments;
there was no question that the state
22 See id. 2.
224 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 20. Apparently Dr. Smith
could not collect the missed
payments on following visits.
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 The modest eorts of Virginia do not belie the basic point.
228 See CPI Conversion Factors 1996, supra note 137.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 36-40 for descriptions of these stan-
dard theories.
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governments had the authority under the police power to appropriate the
sums requested. Moreover, the inactivity of state governments undermines the
theory that Constitutional questions alone were tying the hands of the early
national government.
While laissez-faire explanations at rst seem appealing, the argument just
does not appear in legislative deliberations. There is no sense that spending
on vaccine violated some norm of governance; there was just a feeling that the
amounts being requested were too much. The business subsidy thesis also seems
dicult to apply. Funding for vaccine and decreasing the severity of smallpox
epidemics could only be considered good for the state's business climate just
as spending on internal improvements improved a state's economy. Commercial
interests would be expected to favor measures which would reduce the disruptive
eect of epidemics.
I would propose that a variation on the business subsidy thesis, public choice
theory, provides the best explanation for the behavior of state governments.
Hard-nosed public choice theory ignores cost-less endorsements and exhortations
and focuses on actual subsidies, transfer payments, and regulations. Endorse-
ment of vaccination cost the legislatures nothing and requires little explanation.
State governments failed to spend money, however, because the benets of vacci-
nation, like many public health measures, were widely dispersed over the entire
populace. No special interest group was favored; no interest group was will-
ing to trade votes or election funds for an appropriation. There were no drug
companies who might benet from quality controls on vaccine or subsidies for
vaccine production. It is even possible, that such legislation was against the in-
terests of physicians.230 Only Dr. Smith was specically interested in subsidies
for vaccination, and he did not have the resources to oer
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the state legislatures any inducements. He was not even a resident of most
of the states concerned.
The surprising decision of the national government to enact the 1813 Vaccine
Act, the repeated refusal to appropriate any funding for the Act, and the even-
tual repeal of the Act throw all of these theories, including public choice theory,
into further doubt. No single theory can explain these conicting actions.
IV. The Vaccine Act of 1813: Establishing a National Source of Genuine
Vaccine
The reluctance of state governments to act left a void for the federal government
to ll. For the rst time in the young nation's history, the national government
had the clear opportunity to enact legislation to signicantly advance the public
health and welfare and save countless lives. With surprising ease, the Congress
and the President in 1813 enacted ground-breaking legislation establishing a
much needed national source of vaccine. Congress eectively established a na-
tional vaccine institution by legally mandating that Dr. Smith provide genuine,
uncontaminated vaccine to any citizen upon request in return for Congressional
endorsement of the franking privilege. The 1813 Act marked one of the rst
times Congress stepped squarely outside the text of % 8 of Article 1.231 The
Act's passage confounds established explanations of 19th century legal history.
Though the legislation was emphatically repealed in 1822, the idea was appeal-
ing enough to have been raised again a couple of times through the rest of the
century.232
231 U.S. CONST. Art I,  8.
232 After the 1813 Act was repealed in 1822, bills to revive the institution were
introduced by Dr. Smith's supporters in the following Congresses. See infra
text accompanying notes 463-465. The idea for a national vaccine institution
was independently revived in 1838 and 1882. See infra Part VII.
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A. The Need for a National Source of Genuine Vaccine
There was a signicant need for a reliable national source of smallpox vaccine
in the early 19th century. There were no state-sponsored institutions, and for-
prot institutions were impractical.233 Charitable vaccine institutions did exist
in a few major cities. Vaccine
institutions were formed in New York City in 1802 and in Philadelphia in
1813.234 In Baltimore, Dr. Smith began his own vaccine institution in 1802.
235 According to Dr. Smith, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore were the
only cities in the country where a regular supply of vaccine was maintained.23'
The express purpose of these institutions was to provide vaccine to their cities
and perhaps the surrounding counties; they showed little interest in providing
vaccine to the rest of their states, much less the rest of the country. 237 Rural
and frontier populations were left with hardly any reliable source of vaccine.23'
At this time only a small minority of the nation lived in urban areas large enough
to support a vaccine institution. In 1810, only 250,000 Americans lived in cities
with populations larger than 25,000.239 Another 300,000 lived in smaller cities
of 2,500 to 25,000 inhabitants. The remaining 6,714,000 Americans lived in
small towns and rural areas. Every country doctor could certainly not be
233 See supra Part m. for the failure of state governments to take action.
See supra text accompanying notes 170-175 for the inability of private industry
to provide vaccine.
234 See HALSEY, supra note 101, at 51 (New York institution); VACCINE
SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA, supra note 76.
235 See infra text accompanying notes 117-249.
236 See SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 15.
237 See HALSEY, supra note 101, at 51 (New York institution); NEW
YORK INSTITUTION, FACTS AND OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO THE
KJNE-POCK 6-7 (1802) microformed on Early American Imprints, Second Se-
ries, Fiche 2791 (Readex) (main object of institution was to spread vaccination
among the indigent of the community); VACCINE SOCIETY OF PHILADEL-
PHIA, supra note 76.
238 Of course, it was the major ports of the Eastern Seaboard which were un-
der the most serious threat of smallpox. Nonetheless, smallpox epidemics would
eventually spread inland from the major ports. See supra text accompanying
notes 85-88.
239 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 12 (series A57-69);
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expected to maintain his own supply of cow-pox. As late as the 1880's,
Western doctors complained to Congress of the diculty of obtaining a reliable
supply of vaccine.240
A national source of vaccine would ensure that vaccine was equally available
all across the country. A Congressionally authorized source would provide public
condence in the quality of at least one source of vaccine; the National Agent
was legally required to provide genuine, uncontaminated vaccine. Moreover, it
was wasteful to have local vaccine institutions across the country duplicating
the same eorts.24' In 1808, England created a National Vaccine Establishment
to take over from local institutions the job of performing regular arm-to-arm
transfers on healthy subjects and maintaining a ready supply of uncontaminated
vaccine.242 A similar national vaccine institute was also established in France
early in the century.243 In 1813, Congress eectively followed suit.
B. The Legislative History of the 1813 Vaccine Act
Although Congressional records from this time period are conspicuously
sparse,2 it is clear that a Baltimore physician, Dr. James Smith, was a central
gure in the brief history of the Vaccine Act.245 He recognized very early that
it was indispensably necessary that we should form some plan to secure proper
subjects for Vaccination, in regular and uninterrupted succession, by whom we
might preserve the Vaccine Matter; and from whom we could always obtain it
fresh.2' In 1802 he formed a vaccine institution in Baltimore.247 Smith took it
240 See 13 CONG. REC. 862 (1882).
241 A few independent, redundant institutions might have been the ideal
solution as insurance against accidents at any one institution.
242 See FENNER ET AL., supra note 17, at 263.
243 See BOARD OF MANGERS, supra note 152, at 2.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 50.
245 I have not been able to nd much biographical data on Dr. Smith. The
Harvard University electronic library catalog, Hollis, reports that he lived from
1771 to 1841. Search of Harvard On-Line Library Information System (January
23, 1998) (search for AU Smith James 1771).
246 SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 12.
42
48Rohit Singla The Vaccine Act of 1813
upon himself to maintain a continuous supply of genuine vaccine and test
the ecacy of his supply regularly.24' Dr. Smith seems to have become almost
obsessed with maintaining his vaccine institution and distributing vaccine freely
to the entire nation. He propagated the same sample of cow-pox virus received in
1801 for over twenty years, continuously vaccinating new individuals to maintain
the strain,249 and spent twenty-ve years promoting universal vaccination.
After his failed approaches to state governments for funding,250 Smith lob-
bied Congress in 1812 and early 1813 to have himself appointed National Vaccine
Agent.25' Smith organized petitions from citizens of Pennsylvania and Virginia
asking Congress to provide for the preservation and distribution of the vaccine
virus through Dr. Smith free of any expense, to citizens of the United States.252
The petitions were referred to the House Committee on Post Oces and Post
Roads on Jan 14, 1813.253 Smith himself sent a letter to the Committee asking
for a franking privilege and a small annual expense to allow him to distribute
the vaccine freely.254 Out of naivete, or perhaps generosity, Dr. Smith oered
to
247 See id. at 11; Adavit of James Smith, supra note 117, at 5.
248 See SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 4. Vaccine was tested by
attempting to inoculate a
vaccinated individual with smallpox. If the smallpox inoculation did not aect
the individual, the vaccine
was eective.
249 See Letter from Dr. James Smith to Senator Horsey 4 (Jan. 26, 1821)
appended to Smith, Report, supra
note 144.
250 See supra Part III.
 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 11; BRANT, supra note
45, at 417. He rst approached
Congress in 1811 asking for its patronage and aid to help him introduce
vaccination into the District of
Columbia. His 1811 petition was referred to a select committee on January
30, but never acted upon. See
22 ANNALS OF CONG. 839 (1811).
252 The text of the petitions are included in JAMES SMITH, PROCEED-
INGS RELATIVE TO VACCINATION 1-
2 (1813) microformed on Early American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche
30392 (Readex). For the original
Pennsylvania petition, see Petition of Sundry Inhabitants of the State of Penn-
sylvania to Congress (Dec.
1812) (on le with the National Archives: Library of Congress H. R. Collection,
Box 180) [hereinafter
Pennsylvania Petition]. Smith had the petitions printed with a blank space for
the name of the state.
Presumably he intended to submit petitions from other states.
49253 See Pennsylvania Petition, supra note 252, at cover page.
254 Letter from James Smith to Representative Rhea, Chairman of Committee
on the Post Oce and
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assume the responsibility for providing vaccine free of charge to the nation
without any compensation from the government if the demands of the War of
1812 made it inexpedient to appropriate money for this purpose.- A bill was
reported by the Committee the next day.25' Not surprisingly Congress took
Dr. Smith up on his oer to obligate himself without any compensation. The
bill sailed through the war-time Congress. After minimal debate, the House
passed the bill within the week.257 The Senate concurred a month later without
any signicant opposition.25' President Madison unhesitatingly signed the bill
into law on February 27th.259 Shortly after the Act's passage, Dr. Smith was
appointed the rst National Vaccine Agent by President Madison.2'0 Dr. Smith
served as the National Vaccine Agent for nine years until his commission was
revoked and the Act repealed in 1822 following the Tarboro Tragedy.26'
Thus, without any signicant controversy, Congress in 1813 enacted ground-
breaking public welfare legislation without any textual basis in Article I of the
Constitution.262 Despite the controversy surrounding the practice of vaccination,263
Congress unmistakably endorsed vaccination. It implicitly approved the safety
and ecacy of a biologic drug and
Post Roads (Jan. 15, 1813) in SMITH, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 252, at
2. 255 See id.
256 See H.R. 229, 12th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1813). The original is available at
the National Archives. See H.R.
229, 12th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1813) (on le with the National Archives: House
Documents, Box 12A-B1,
Original House Bills). Only trivial amendments were made to the bill related
to enforcement of the
limits on the franking privilege. See infra note 272.
257 See id.; 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 95, 844, 958, 1080-81 (1813).
258 See 25 ANNALS OF CONG. 98, 101, 106, 107 (1831).
259 See BRANT, supra note 45, at 417.
260 By April, Dr. Smith had already widely publicized his new appointment.
See Letter from Francis Le
Barron to Dr. James Smith (Apr. 12, 1813), supra note l44See also,
BRANT, supra note 45, at 417.
261 See infra Part VI.
262 At this time Congress did not interpret the Commerce or General Welfare
Clauses, U.S. CONST, Art. I, x 8, cl. 1, 3, as expansively as is common today.
See Mayer, supra note 4sArguing that vaccine distribution as a Congressional
perogative under the Commerce Clause would have been very controvertial.
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sought to encourage public acceptance of the drug. One of James Smith's
purposes in lobbying for the Act was to use the Congressional endorsement to
overcome public skepticism of vaccine.2'4 Congress also recognized the need for
a semi-public national source for the smallpox vaccine. This was not a matter
to be left to the states or the private sector. Congressional endorsement led
to public condence in the ecacy and legitimacy of at least one source of
vaccine.265 People could depend on vaccine from Dr. Smith to be authentic
and uncontaminated with other diseases. The National Vaccine Agent was
required to preserve the genuine vaccine matter and to furnish the same to any
American. Overnight, Smith's Baltimore vaccine institution was transformed
into a national source of vaccine|obligated under penalty of federal law to
maintain a supply of vaccine indenitely between outbreaks and distribute safe
vaccine upon request. Congress had de facto established a national vaccine
 266
institute.
Congress also provided a signicant subsidy for the distribution of the drug;
the Act provided free franking to or from the Agent of packages up to one half
ounce related to vaccination.267 The value of the franking privilege at the time
should not be underestimated. In 1813, postage on a half ounce package was
$0.24 to $1 depending on the distance.26' An additional payment to the mail
carrier was necessary for city delivery. 269 Adjusted for ination, the postage
savings amounted to $3 to $11 per package by the time the Act was
265 See supra Part II.C.1.
264 See Adavit of James Smith, supra note 117, at 5.
265 See id.
266 Smith did not begin referring to his institution as the National Vaccine
Institution until 1818. See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54.
267 See Act to Encourage Vaccination, ch. 37,  2, 2 Stat. 806 (1813)
repealed by An Act to Repeal the Act to Encourage Vaccination, ch. 50, 3 Stat.
677 (1922).
268 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 807 (series R190).
Prices in HISTORICAL STATISTICS are given in sheets. I have assumed that
four sheets constituted a half ounce.
269 See id. at n. 6.
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repealed.270 This was a considerable subsidy. The franking privilege was
taken very seriously by Congress. Most of the half-page Act consist of provi-
sions intended to strictly limit Smith's use of the franking privilege.27' The only
two amendments made to the original bill were phrases intended to strictly con-
trol the privilege of the frank.272 Previously Congress had granted the franking
privilege only the likes of high Executive ocers, members of Congress, former
Presidents and their widows.273
C Explaining the 1813 Vaccine Act
It is dicult to reconcile the 1813 Act and related legislative episodes with
standard historical explanations for the ante-bellum federal government's rel-
ative inactivity. It is particularly dicult to account for the ease with which
Congress passed the 1813 Act and the repeated refusals over the following years
to provide the Vaccine agent with even modest funding.274 Certainly the refusal
to fund the Agent undermines any notion that Congress was acting under the
salus populi thesis, placing the health of the people above all else. There is
simply no discussion in the record referencing norms of laissez-faire capitalism.
Besides the provisions of the 1813 Act itself seem to violate those very norms.
Dr. Smith does not appear
270 See CPI Conversion Factors 1996, supra note 137.
271 See 2 Stat. 806, x 2 (1813).
272 The emphasized phrases in the following excerpts were added to the
original bill. That all letters or packages, not exceeding half an ounce in weight,
containing vaccine matter, or relating to the subject of vaccination, and that
alone, shall be carried. .. free of any postage. .. [for violation thereof] he shall
on conviction of every such oense, forfeit and pay a ne of fty dollars, to be
recovered in the same manner as other nes or violations of law establishing the
post-oce. (emphasis added) Compare 2 Stat. 806,  2 (1813) with HR. 229,
12th Cong., 2nd Sess.,  2 (1813), supra note 256.
273 See, e.g., Act to Establish Post-Oce & Post Roads, ch. 7,  19, 1 Stat.
232 (1791) reenacted ch. 23,  19,
1 Stat. 354, 361-62 (1794) (President, Vice-President, Congressmen during
attendance, Secretaries of
Treasury, State, and War, Postmaster General, Comptroller); Act to Extend
the Privilege of Franking to
the Secretary of the Navy, ch. 56, 1 Stat. 569 (1798); Act to Extend the
Privilege of Franking... to
Martha Washington, ch. 18, 2 Stat. 19 (1800); Act Freeing from Postage...
John Adams, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 102
(1801) (President John Adams after his retirement).
274 See infra Part V.
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to have had the political or nancial capital to induce Congress to grant him
such a valuable position under any public choice analysis.
Perhaps there were concerns over the federal power to spend money for vac-
cine. It was certainly raised repeatedly in debates over funding the Vaccine
Agent and repealing the 1813 Act.275 In the 1822 debate over the repeal of
the Act, even a supporter of Dr. Smith, Representative Condict, recalled that
though many wanted to provide Smith a salary in 1813, some doubted the Con-
stitutional power of Congress to apply the public money in this way.. 276 The
frank can be explained away as an exercise of Congressional authority to Estab-
lish Post Oces.277 The problem with the Constitutional argument, however, is
that Congress did not have any explicit5 8 power to demand that an individual
preserve the genuine vaccine matter and furnish the same to every American.27'
How can Congress have the latter power, but not the power to allocate $1500
in support of its mandate? I suppose its possible that such inconsistent inter-
pretation of the Constitution might have been accepted at the time, but none
of the opponents of the Act were ideologically committed to federalism. There
was always some other dominant political motivation.27' Federalism was never
more than a throw-away line. Moreover, federalism certainly was not inhibiting
the states from
275 See infra text accompanying notes 343-349, 354, 444-451.
276 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1637 (1822).
277 U.S. CONST. Art. I, 5 8, cl. 7.
278 There is a suggestion rst made in the 1822 debate over the repeal of the
1813 Act, that Congress never had the power to enforce the demands it placed on
the National Vaccine Agent. Once Dr. Smith had failed to furnish the genuine
vaccine matter to every citizen, Congress was left with no legal recourse. See 39
ANNALS OF CONG. 1635-39 (1822). This interpretation is suspect on a couple
of dierent grounds. First, it was never raised in an earlier discussion of the
Act or its expansion. Second, while legislation has been declared unenforceable
by the courts, it is dicult to imagine Congress intentionally passing wholly
hortatory, unenforceable legislation. Third, had Congress had such an intent
in 1813, it could have easily required Dr. Smith to post a bond payable to the
President to guarantee his compliance.
279 See infra text accompanying notes 343-349, 354, 444-451.
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devoting funds to vaccination; some other policy was repressing their concern
for the health of the public.
It is possible that Congress' attitude can be explained under the business
subsidy thesis. Perhaps Congress viewed Dr. Smith not as a public servant,
but as a private entrepreneur deserving of a legislative advantage much like
companies building toll roads or bridges were supported by state legislatures at
this time.280 Though Smith did not consider himself a private operator, certainly
his critics often assailed him as the beneciary of a federal monopoly.28' In this
case, Congress might have seen the franking privilege as part of a business
franchise but viewed direct nancial grants as wholly inappropriate for a prot-
making business. While there is little in Congressional records to support such
an interpretation, it is plausible.
At least for the failure to provide funding for Dr. Smith in the 1813 Act
itself, there are more mundane explanations. The government might have le-
gitimately needed all available funds to pursue the War of 1812. The nation
ran large budget decits for the rst time between 1812 and 1815 due to bal-
looning expenditures on the Army.282 It is also possible that Congress failed to
appropriate money for Dr. Smith simply because Dr. Smith did not demand
it strongly enough. In a letter to Representative Champion in the previous
Congressional session, Dr. Smith had asked Congress only to provide people
requesting vaccine reduced postage or more gratifying to me free postage.2'3 He
makes no mention whatsoever of any direct payments. In his 1813 letter to the
select committee considering his petitions, he oered to become the National
Vaccine Agent without any funding whatsoever
280 See HANDLIN, supra note 37.
281 See infra text accompanying notes 286-290.
282 See 1-LISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 1104 (series Y336-37),
1115 (series Y458).
283 See Letter from James Smith to Rep. Champion (Mar. 23, 1812) (on
le with Harvard Medical
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if Congress thought expedient.2'4 Smith's ambivalent attitude is not surpris-
ing considering his simultaneous eort to obtain state funding. At this time
his Maryland lottery had nally begun to bear fruit,2'5 and he might still have
had hopes that states like Virginia and Pennsylvania would lend their support.
While state governments could always provide him with money, they could not
grant him the valuable franking privilege; only Congress could do that. None
of this explains Congress' later refusals to fund Dr. Smith. But even without
direct funding, the 1813 Act managed to arouse opposition to Smith's position
and franking privilege.
D. Opposition to the National Vaccine Agent and the 1818 Proposal for
State Vaccine Agents
There was signicant opposition to the 1813 Act after its passage based not
on grounds of federalism or laissez-faire capitalism but based anti-monopoly
sentiment and the nancial interests of physicians. Dr. Smith claimed that
many considered his position in the envious light of a monopoliser [sic].28' Even
though it does not appear possible that a vaccine distributor could have made a
prot,287 there was still much resentment directed towards Dr. Smith's favored
position. He was not seen by some as a public servant, but as a private operator
who had obtained the favor of the government. With his valuable franking
subsidy and the endorsement of the national government, Smith seemed to be
one of those privileged insiders of whom the Jacksonians complained. People
believed that he was making large sums from his appointment.28' The amount
of criticism Smith was receiving can perhaps be gauged
School's Countway Rare Book Library).
284 See Letter from James Smith to Representative Rhea, supra note 254,
at 2.
285 See supra text accompanying note 206.
286 Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 6.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 170-175.
288 See Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 5; SMITH, TWO LETTERS,
supra note 78, at 2.
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by his tirade against critics in a 1820 report to Congress.2'9 Smith felt be-
sieged enough to defend his public service and attack his critics at length. Smith
concluded by noting that his best eorts can only increase the catalogue of un-
generous accusations, which a suspicious and ungrateful world will ever be ready
to make against him.290
Smith attributed the bulk of the criticism not to anti-monopoly sentiments
but to the greed of physicians. Dr. Smith was a major advocate of lay vaccina-
tion; he believed that with proper instructions and a supply of genuine vaccine,
laypersons could vaccinate each other without resort to physicians.29' Smith
would routinely send vaccine with instructions to laypersons, eliminating the
need for local physicians to administer vaccinations.292 Though governments
seemed to believe that lay vaccination was eective,293 needless to say the prac-
tice was opposed physicians' groups as dangerous.294 Smith compounded the
problem for physicians by oering free certications of vaccination. Because
of public mistrust of the vaccine supply and doubts as to whether vaccination
had been correctly performed, people were often uncertain of whether they had
indeed gained immunity to smallpox. Physicians were consulted to determine
the authenticity of vaccinations; physicians either examined the vaccination site
or subjected the patient to variolation. Smith interfered with this business by
oering to certify vaccinations by examining samples of vaccine scabs sent to
him through the mail. 299
289 Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 6.
291 SMITH, TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 33.
292 See Letter from James Smith to Senator Lloyd (Apr. 25, 1822) appended to
H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822).
293 20 J. OF SENATE OF PENN. 1809-1810, supra note 65, at 201.
294 See, e.g., Report on the Failures Attributed to the Vaccine in Charleston
(1817) microformed on Early
American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 41394 (Readex); MEDICAL SOCI-
ETY OF THE COUNTRY OF NEW
YORK, supra note 66s, at 15 (directly attacking Smith's support for lay vacci-
nation in his 1816
Memorial); Smith, Report supra note 144, at 7.
298 See Letter from James Smith to Senator Lloyd (Apr. 25, 1822) appended to
H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822).
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According to Smith the eorts of his agents to hold mass educational meet-
ings on vaccination and vaccinate a hundred or two hundred people also aroused
the ire of physicians.29' The charitable eorts of his agents had
often given great oense to many practitioners [physicians] of selsh & con-
tracted views, who complain, that we thus take a business from them; which
they think themselves privileged to turn to their own particular advantage...
[and] indulge a hope that some day might come when they would derive a lit-
tle prot from vaccination or reap perhaps an abundant harvest from such a
loathsome and fatal plague as the Small Pox.297
Though Smith might have been exaggerating the extent of opposition from
physicians groups and Jacksonians, some evidence of the growing opposition
to Smith's alleged privileges can be found in a strange 1818 bill. The House
passed a bill which invited each state to appoint its own vaccine agent and
extended the franking privilege to all these state agents.29' The bill was rejected
by the Senate on a 17-12 vote as unnecessary, bad precedent, and subject in itself
to abuse.299 Either the senators thought it dangerous to extend the frank to so
many individuals or the senators were defending Dr. Smith's position. While
there is negligible legislative history for the bill, it was probably an indirect
attack on Dr. Smith since the bill did not have any other obvious purpose.300
There was little point in each state having its own agent maintaining a separate
vaccine supply; such redundancy would
Though Smith claims that he could verify the authenticity of a vaccination by
examing a scab, there was considerable medical controversy over this procedure.
296 See infra text accompanying notes 372-Error! Bookmark not dened..
297 Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 7-8.
298 See H.R. 29, 15th Cong, 1st Sess. (1818); 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1452
(1818).
29931 ANNALS OF CONG. 299 (1818). The bill as slightly amended by a
Senate Committee is on le at the
National Archives. See H.R. 29 as amended, 15th Cong, 1st Sess. (1818) (on
le with the National
Archives: Senate Documents, Box iSA-Cl, House Bills).
300 The bill does not seem to have been drafted to address federalism concerns
since Smith's appointment was not withdrawn. Encouraging state agents would
not have solved any Constitutional problems with federal appointment of a
vaccine agent.
51
58Rohit Singla The Vaccine Act of 1813
clearly be a waste.30' Thus the bill seems to have been a sign of growing
unease with Smith's supposed monopoly. Smith, himself, appears to have viewed
the 1818 bill as an attack on his oce. He condemned Attempts... by some, who
are professedly hostile to every National Establishment, to take the Management
of this Plan out of my hands, to give it to others who would be under the
immediate direction and control of the State Authorities. 302
It is not clear how large a role anti-monopoly sentiments or opposition from
physician's interests played in the eventual repeal of the Act. Certainly the
rhetoric of Smith and his opponents during the Tarboro Tragedy was redolent
with these themes, but perhaps the rhetoric was little more than that. In
Part VI, I argue that simple anger over the scandal was the ultimate cause
of the 1813 Act. Despite the opposition described, there was also considerable
support expressed for Smith's eorts, and Congress seriously considered massive
expansions of the 1813 Act a number of times over the following years.
V. Proposals to Ensure Funding for Smith's National Vaccine Institute
Even though some viewed Dr. Smith as a monopolizing proteer, he always
viewed himself as a public servant. Smith never wanted to charge for vac-
cine. His goal throughout this story remained to maintain a vaccine supply and
distribute vaccine to the populace freely in order to encourage universal vacci-
nation. When regular funding from states governments failed to materialize,303
Smith approached Congress for nancial support. Proposals for direct fund-
ing of a National Vaccine Institute were rejected by Congress in 1816, 1817,
and 1818. For possible explanations of Congress' repeated failures to fund the
Vaccine Agent, see Part IV.C. After being repeatedly rebued, Smith nally
decided to privately raise
301 While there might certainly be a value to redundant vacine institutions,
one for every state seems rather excessive.
302 Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 9.
 In 1816, even Maryland refused to reauthorize a lottery. See supra text
accompanying note 208.
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a charitable endowment for his institution, but Congress refused to grant him
a corporate charter. Each of the rejected proposals would have not only guar-
anteed the continuity of the vaccine supply, but also resulted in the widespread
distribution of free vaccine to the populace. Had any of the proposals been en-
acted, it would have been an unparalleled milestone in Federal support for the
public welfare. Before he could further pursue his plans, the Tarboro Tragedy
eectively ended his career.
A. The Finances of the National Vaccine Agent
Even though Congress clearly expected the Agent to charge for vaccine,
Dr. Smith largely distributed smallpox vaccine without charge. He knew both
that he could never sell enough vaccine during epidemics to recoup the cost of
maintaining vaccine and that the public would not tolerate being charged by
the National Vaccine Agent. Upon being appointed, he immediately agreed to
provide the military with free vaccine through the War of 1812304 and continued
to do so for years after the war ended.305 He distributed vaccine without charge
to the poor306 and all surgeons who asked for it.307 Nine Baltimore physicians
stated in 1818 that for more than eight years past, we have always received the
genuine Vaccine Matter, free of any charges from Dr. James Smith.30' Smith
also claimed that by tracking the requests for vaccine he was receiving, he could
trace with considerable accuracy the daily progress which the Small Pox made
in the United States, and in response he would pro-actively mail vaccine to the
postmasters in the path of the spreading epidemic.309
304 See Letter from Dr. James Smith to Francis Le Barron, Surgeon U.S.
Army, at 2 (Apr. 14, 1813) copy appended to Smith, Report, supra note 144.
See Letter from Francis Le Barron, Surgeon U.S. Army, to Dr. James Smith
(Nov. 5, 1816), supra note 145; Letter from James Smith to Senator Horsey
(Jan. 26, 1821), supra note 249, at 6.
306 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 25.
307 See SMITH, 1816 MEMORIAL, supra note 149, at 4.
308 See James Cromwell, et. al., Physician's Certicate in SMITH, PROSPEC-
TUS, supra note 54, at 9.
309 SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 24.
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In 1819, Smith hired a number of agents to distribute vaccine and collect
contributions for his Vaccine Institution.3'0 These agents were instructed not
to charge for their services but to vaccinate the young and the old, the rich as
well as the poor; and to give the genuine matter [vaccine] to every intelligent
family who may wish to inject it for themselves.31' Smith claimed that his
agents vaccinated 100,000 people free of charge in 18 19-1820 alone.312 Smith's
estimate does not seem to be an exaggeration even though there was no major
epidemic in this period. The population of the six states his agents frequented
was only 2.8 million,313 so he is only claiming that his agents vaccinated 3.6%
of the population of these states in two years. Since he was employing about
ten agents at any given time,314 each agent would have needed to vaccinated an
average of 5000 people per year.
James Smith grew increasingly frustrated at the refusal of state governments
and then the federal government to nancially support his eorts.315 He began
to complain bitterly about how Congress and the states had failed to pay him for
his troubles.3 When Congress refused in 1817 to reimburse him for the vaccine he
was providing the Army, Smith became angry and threatened to stop supplying
the Army with vaccine.  The Surgeon General of the Army quickly agreed to
pay the $1500 Smith demanded. Smith eventually decided that the goal of free
distribution of vaccine was unavoidably postponed given the
310 infra text accompanying notes 372-Error! Bookmark not dened..
311 Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 4.
312 See Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 8-9. But see 39 ANNALS OF
CONG. 1637-38 (1822) (Congressional
supporter of Smith's claimed in 1822 that his eorts had vaccinated only the
very modest gure of 50,000
- 100,000 people in 9 years).
313 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 35-36 (series A199);
314 See infra text accompanying note 373.
315 For the reluctance of state governments, see supra Part III. For the refusal
of Congress, see the remainder of Part V.
316 See, e.g., Letter from Dr. James Smith to Francis Le Barron (Apr. 14,
1813), supra note 304, at 2; SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 25;
Letter from James Smith to Senator Horsey (Jan. 26, 1821), supra note 249,
passim.
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government's failure to nancially support his vaccine production and dis-
tribution and tried to begin charging for vaccine. In 1818, after nine years
of trying to obtain government funding, Dr. Smith announced that he would
henceforth charge the public $5 for a supply of vaccine.31' He was unable to
collect much money from vaccine sales, however. The public resented being
charged for vaccine by the National Vaccine Agent. Smith complained that The
Agent, however,.ought not to be permitted to charge any fees for his services.
His fees, as I have experienced. . . are odious. 319 People assumed that the Na-
tional Vaccine Agent was a government employee paid by Congress; they were
suspicious of Smith's attempt to charge them.320 In attempting to charge for
vaccine, Dr. Smith felt that he must always be placed in the estimation of the
public on the degrading level with every advertising Quack or Impostor, who
expects to enrich himself upon the suering of his fellow creatures. 321
Nevertheless, between the Maryland lottery, the Virginia appropriation, and
payments from the Army, Smith had collected over $15,000 by 1818. He collected
another $11,000 in the next couple of years in private donations.322 He was
probably not being pushed into penury, and may have even been making a nice
living o of his appointment. He acknowledged with thankfulness the receipt of
my pecuniary reward, you will, I hope perceive, that it has not been extravagant,
nor of such amount as should be complained of as inconvenient, either to the
public or to any private citizen. 323 On the other hand, in response to the
attack on his position following the Tarboro Tragedy, Smith claimed that he
had spent more on printing and stationary alone, to furnish proper directions
for the popular [lay] use
317 See infra Part VI.C.
318 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 26, 29, 32.
 See Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 4.
320 See Letter from James Smith to Senator Horsey, supra note 249, at 2.
321 Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 5.
322 See infra text accompanying notes 379-381.
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of the kine-pock. . . than all the fees I ever received for vaccine matter
since.. . 1813.324 Moreover, Smith had mortgaged his private property to
guarantee the Maryland lottery's
32
success, and posted a $40,000 bond to ensure that donations would be used
not for his private gain but to endow a permanent national vaccine institution.32'
Whatever Smith's
ability to support himself without government funding, Congress pointedly
refused to appropriate money to support his vaccine institution.
B. Proposals for Comprehensive National Distribution of Vaccine in the
14th Congress
After the War of 1812, the 14th Congress seriously considered paying for the
comprehensive distribution of free vaccine throughout the nation. Dr. Smith
petitioned Congress in January 1816 emphasizing that his intent all along had
been to provide free vaccine to the populous with some nancial support from
Congress.'27 Since peace... now again smiles on our happy Country, Smith asked
Congress to increase its support for his eorts.32' Smith proposed an odd and
highly impractical plan to extirpate the Small Pox without any expense to the
National Government. 329 He sought to overcome the inability to successfully
sell vaccine by imposing a small federal tax on every vaccination conducted by
a physician. This tax would be used to support Smith's vaccine institution
and the free distribution of vaccine. Smith thought perhaps 6/4 cents per
vaccination would suce initially but a smaller fee would be sucient if and
when vaccination became more universal.330 Smith also oered to maintain a
record of everyone vaccinated throughout the
323 SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 25-26.
324 Letter from James Smith to Senator Lloyd (Apr. 25, 1822) appended to
H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822).
325 See supra text accompanying note 206.
326 See infra text accompanying note 370.
327 See SMITH, 1816 MEMORiAL, supra note 149, at 4.
328 Id. at 5.
329 See id. at 9-12.
330Id at 11, n. 4.
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country and provide annual reports to Congress)31 The plan was obviously
untenable. Direct federal taxes were almost unheard of at the time. Dr. Smith
does not explain how the federal government with its tiny bureaucracy in 1816
could have possibly collected such a tax. Raising the price of vaccinations,
even marginally, would appear, at least at rst glance, to be a deterrent to
vaccination. Moreover, even such a small tax on vaccinations appears shockingly
self-serving. We can imagine that news of this ill-advised proposal would have
increased the opposition of physicians and Jacksonians to his position.
Not surprisingly, Congress showed absolutely no interest in Smith's foolish
plan. Instead, in February 1816, a bill was introduced in the House which would
have funded through general revenues a signicant administrative bureaucracy
to distribute smallpox vaccine freely throughout the United States.332 The ambi-
tious bill would have provided the Vaccine Agent with $1500 for his services.333
In exchange, Dr. Smith would have agreed not to accept money from state or
local governments and to provide to any Citizen of the United States... the gen-
uine vaccine matter... free of any cost, charge, or expense whatsoever.334 Most
importantly, the Vaccine Agent was required to supply postmasters throughout
the country with at least ve parcels of fresh vaccine every three months. 
The postmasters were instructed to distribute the vaccine in their communities
as needed. The bill eectively made postmasters throughout the country local
repositories of vaccine supplies and subordinates of the National Vaccine Agent.
Clearly, a signicant vaccine factory would need to be
331 See id. at 12.
332 See H.R. 73 as amended, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. (1816) (on le with Na-
tional Archives: House
Documents, Box 14A.B1, Original House Bills). The unamended bill is micro-
formed on Early
American Imprints, Second Series, Fiche 39298 (Readex). Section two of the
original bill required the
Vaccine Agent to supply just one ocer in New Orleans with a continuous
supply of vaccine. Before
debate on the bill, it was amended to provide for the entire country. See id.
 See id.  4.
' See id. x 1 (emphasis added).
 See id.  2 This provisions is reminiscent of Smith's practice of pro-
actively sending vaccine to post.
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established in Washington or Baltimore to supply such massive quantities
of vaccine. If the bill had been enacted, vaccine would be continuously kept
on-hand in every part of the country. Properly implemented, there would have
never been a shortage of vaccine in the United States again. The bill also
imposed Congressional reporting requirements on Dr. Smith33' and mandated
compulsory military vaccination.337
Unfortunately, no action was taken on the bill until very late in the session,
just before it ended on April 3Q338 During the initial discussions of the bill
there was general support for the measure. After much debate on April 19,
the Vaccine Agent's annual compensation was set at $1500?' Adjusted for
ination that is approximately $14,000. On April 27, a motion to kill the
bill was defeated, and the bill's duration was extended from three years to seven
years.34' Just two days later, however, the bill was postponed indenitely on a
49 to 48 vote.342 The opposition to the bill was led by Daniel Webster (serving
as a representative from New Hampshire in his rst term in Congress) and
Representative Pickering of Massachusetts.
Webster and Pickering rst argued, quite reasonably, that since the Con-
gressional session was at an end, there was not enough time for proper consider-
ation of the bill. They also argued, however, that the $1500 appropriation was
outside of Congress' Constitutional authority.343 While the scope of Congress'
power during this period was a contentious issue,
masters in areas threatened with smallpox. See supra text accompanying
note 309.
336 See id.  3.
 See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1455 (1816).
' See 10 HOUSEJ. 767 (1816).
'' See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1408 (1816).
340 See CPI Conversion Factors 1996, supra note 137.
341 See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1455 (1816); H.R. 73 as amended, supra
note 332, at x 6.
342 See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1457 (1816).
 See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1457 (1816).
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Webster and Pickering's resort to federalism appears disingenuous.344 First,
federalism was never once mentioned during the debates over the bill in the
proceeding past two weeks.345 Second, Pickering championed the Bonus Bill of
1817 which was widely considered to expansively interpret the grant of power
to Congress and was vetoed by President Madison on grounds of federalism.34'
Daniel Webster also supported the Bonus Bill.347 Third, at no time does anyone
propose the repeal of the original Act. If providing $1500 for the Vaccine Agent
violates Article I, then so certainly does legally mandating that Dr. Smith
furnish. .. to any citizen the genuine vaccine matter.34' Finally, if federalism
was the House's real concern with the bill, it would have looked more favorably
on Dr. Smith's 1818 request for funding for individuals clearly under federal
sovereignty.34'
Seemingly undaunted, Dr. Smith again petitioned Congress in December
1816, at the beginning of its next session. He asked Congress to make some
suitable provision.., to enable him to supply [vaccine] free of any charges to the
citizenry.350 For good measure Dr. Smith emphasized the need of the military
for smallpox vaccine. A few days later one of Dr. Smith's champions, Represen-
tative Condict, introduced a bill substantively similar to the previous sessions'
bill.35' Again, there was a lengthy debate over the amount of compensation for
Dr. Smith. And, again the House nally settled on $1500 given that Dr. Smith
was
' But see SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 27 (claiming Congress
refused to appropriate a salary for him due to Constitutional concerns).
' See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1408, 1455 (1816).
346 See supra note 45. The Bonus Bill allocated for internal improvements,
i.e., roads and canals, the $1.5 million received from the First Bank of the United
States for its charter.
 See 31 ANNALS OF CONG. (1817).
' 2 Stat. 806, x 1 (1813). But see supra note 278.
'v See Part V.C.
390 Letter from James Smith to Congress (Dec. 6, 1816) in 30 ANNALS OF
CONG. 254 (1817).
 See H.R. 6, 14th Cong., 2d Sess. (1816).
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expected to continue in private practice while serving as Vaccine Agent.352
There was no discussion of Congressional authority to enact such a bill. Once
again the bill was defeated; this time on a 87 to 55 vote.353 Representative
Atherton led the opposition in 1817. Atherton briey argued that x 8 did not
grant Congress the authority to spend money on vaccine354 to which supporters
responded by citing the bill's benets to the military and Congress' power under
the General Welfare Clause.355 Once again, however, federalism appears to be
a throwaway argument.35' The focus of Atherton's lengthy speech was the bill's
support of lay vaccination, i.e. the distribution of vaccine to laypersons for self-
medication.357 I can not conceive of a more direct method of endangering the
health and life of the patient [than lay vaccination].35' He argued that because
of its support of lay vaccination instead of being a bill for the encouragement
of vaccination, ought to be called a bill.., to bring vaccination into disrepute.359
Either Atherton honestly believed that lay vaccination was dangerous or he
as defending the interests of physicians whose business position was totally
undermined by the bill's provisions.
C. The 1818 Proposal to Fund Vaccine for Washington, Federal Territo-
ries, and the Military
After Congress had twice failed to provide him with direct compensation for
a national program of vaccine distribution, Dr. Smith decided to change tacks.
He asked Congress in January 1818 for a $1500 annual emolument to support
the provision of the
352 See 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 361 (1817).
 See id. at 470.
 U.S. CONST. Art. 1,  8. See 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 469 (1817).
 U.S. CONST. Art. 1, x 8, cl. 1. See 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 470 (1817).
356 See supra text accompanying notes 343-349.
 See 30 Annals of Cong. 469-70 (1817). See supra text accompanying notes
291-295 for discussion of
Smith's support of lay vaccination.
358 See 30 Annals of Cong. 470 (1817).
 Id.
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vaccine to individuals clearly within the connes of federal sovereignty|
Washington, federal territories, and the military.360 The $1500 would allow the
vaccine institution to continue maintaining a vaccine supply to the benet of
the entire nation while avoiding the Constitutional concerns raised by Pickering,
Webster, and Atherton. There was no doubt that Congress could provide for
the welfare of the military and residents of federal territories. A House commit-
tee praised Dr. Smith for his eorts as National Vaccine Agent and agreed that
the vaccination of the military was dictated by duty and interest.36' However
the committee decided that military vaccination may be readily accomplished
through the surgeons of the Army and Navy, without subjecting the government
to the expense of paying Dr. Smith. Apparently the committee did not realize
that it was Dr. Smith who had supplied the military with vaccine throughout
the War of 1812 and continued to supply them afterwards.362 The Board of
Managers of Smith's vaccine institution noted that military surgeons were not
well placed to maintain supplies of vaccine given their other duties. They were
simply too busy and mobile. Smith's institution had supplied the military with
vaccine for years.363 The committee did not even address the needs of residents
of federal territories and atly rejected Smith's petition. After this latest rejec-
tion, an angry James Smith refused to provide military surgeons with vaccine
until some nancial support for his vaccine institution was oered. This was im-
mediately ordered by the Honbl. Secretary of War, and after receiving payment
from the Army, Dr. Smith resumed supplying Army surgeons with vaccine.364
360 See James Smith, Memorial to Congress (Jan. 10, 1818) inSMITH,
PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 29-31.
361 Report of House Committee (Feb. 3,1818) inSMITH, PROSPECTUS,
supra note 54, at 3 1-32.
362 See supra text accompanying note 305.
 See BOARD OF MANAGERS, supra note 152, at 4. The Army continued
its practice of compulsory vaccination after the 1813 Act was repealed. See H.
DOC. No. 19-90 (1826). It is not clear for how long after the repeal of the 1813
Act they continued to obtain vaccine from Dr. Smith.
 Letter from James Smith to Senator Horsey, supra note 249, at 6-7.
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D. Incorporating a Charitably Funded Vaccine Institution
After ve years of repeated funding rejections from Congress, Smith adopted
a new strategy; he decided to raise private charitable funds for his National
Vaccine Institution. In the spring of 1818, he published a Prospectus of a Per-
manent National Vaccine Institution.36 Dr. Smith oered memberships, or
subscriptions, of $10 to physicians. Memberships would support the continuing
operation of the institution and guarantee physicians up to ve years of un-
limited vaccine.3 Dr. Smith estimated that he needed 500 subscriptions, i.e.,
$5000, to continue in operation.367 He also solicited donations which were to be
used to erect a permanent building for the vaccine institution in Washington368
and establish a permanent endowment for the institute. Smith posted a $40,000
bond payable to the President to guarantee that he would abide by his proposal
and return all the donations and subscriptions if he was unable to implement
his plan.30 He asked the public to consider his institution as convenient [as]
national Telegraphs stationed at every post oce, since it would deliver vaccine
quickly to any post oce in the country where an epidemic threatened.37'
To jump start his ambitious plan, Dr. Smith hired a number of agents in
1819 and sent them into neighboring states to widely disseminate vaccine and
collect subscriptions and
365 SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54.
366 See SMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 5.
367 See id. at 5-6.
368 By 1818 Smith recognized the need to move his institution from Balti-
more to Washington, the seat of the national government. Id. at 28-29. Though
Smith focused on the ability to distribute vaccine throughout the country via
legislators returning home, clearly he must have understood that an institution
in Washington was more likely to gain national support. Vaccine distribution,
after all, was largely accomplished through the mail.
369 See id. at 6-7; Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 1. The endowment
money would be patriotically invested in U.S. government bonds. See SMITH,
PROSPECTUS,supra note 54, at 6.
370 See Adavit of William Brent, Clerk of Circuit Court for District of
Columbia inSMITH, PROSPECTUS, supra note 54, at 8.
371 Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 6.
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donations.372 In his 1821 report to Congress, Smith lists twenty-one agents,
eleven of whom were still active.373 These agents traveled through Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and North Carolina.374 According to
Smith, he supplied these agents with horses, stationary, and vaccine at his own
expense.375 They were directed to vaccinate the young and the old, the rich
as well as the poor and distribute vaccine to all who asked free of charge.37'
Smith hoped that such generosity would attract subscriptions and donations to
his vaccine institute. The agents organized mass meetings of a hundred or more
people at which they praised vaccination and oered free vaccination.377 Smith
estimates that the eorts of his agents resulted in the vaccinations of some
100,000 persons in 1819 and 1820.378 His agents also collected funds for the
institute, keeping 20% for themselves as the cost of collection. As of January 1,
1821, Smith reports receiving pledges-of $23,125 in subscriptions and $12,509 in
donations.379 But the pledges totaled $35,634, he had only managed to collect
$ 14,460.380 After deducting 20% in collection costs, he was left with about
$11,500 ($130,000 adjusted for ination).38' Given that the combined population
of the six states at the time was only 2.8
372 See id. at 2. Smith, apparently, began a couple of years earlier with
one agent sent to Pennsylvania with the primary purpose of nding healthy
unvaccinated individuals in order to maintain the vaccine supply. See SMITH,
TWO LETTERS, supra note 78, at 32.
 See Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 11. 'i See id. at 3.
'i See id. at 2.
376 See id. at 6.
 See id. at 7.
378 See id. at 8-9. Smith's estimate of 100,000 vaccinations seems quite
reasonable. See supra text accompanying notes 312-314.
'' See id. at 2-3. See also 7 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF
CONG. 8 (1820) (representative reporting that as of Jan. 1, 1820 Smith had
received $26,000 in subscriptions).
380 See Smith, Report, supra note 144, at 2-3.
381 See CPI Conversion Factors 1996, supra note 137.
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million,3'2 this was not a bad fund-raising eort. Smith, however, was very
disappointed with what he thought was a poor showing.
Smith was increasingly condent private subscriptions would allow him to
provide free vaccine, but he needed Congress to incorporate his institution.383
Incorporation would ensure the continuity of the enterprise after Smith's death
and thus encourage contributions. Without incorporation, people were essen-
tially giving money to Smith's personal estate. Though he had posted the
bond to guarantee his faithful use of the donated funds while alive, the donated
funds would revert to Smith's heirs upon his death. Incorporation by Congress
would also imbue his eorts with the imprimatur of the national government
and encourage contributions from the entire country.384 Smith probably did not
seek incorporation in any state for fear that sectarian feelings would discourage
people in other states from donating.
After choosing a board of managers, Dr. Smith's National Vaccine Institu-
tion formally petitioned Congress for incorporation.3'5 A bill was introduced in
the House in January 1820,386 but there was no consideration of the bill until
Congress' next session.387 The bill would have incorporated the institution as a
semi-public agency. Though no funding would be provided by the government,
Congress could remove managers and ocers of the institution for malfeasance
or negligence, and the President had the authority to appoint new
382 See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 51, at 35-36 (series A199).
This gure includes only the white
populations of these states.
313 Incorporation was not freely available until the Jacksonian period; at this
time incorporation required
an act of a legislature.
 Letter from James Smith to Senator Horsey (Jan. 26, 1821), supra note
249, at 8.
385 See BOARD OF MANAGERS, supra note 152.
 See 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 891 (1819).
387 See 37 ANNALS OF CoNG. 462 (1820); H.R. 35, 16th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1820) (original on le with the National Archives: House Documents, Box
16A-B1, Original House Bills).
64
71Rohit Singla The Vaccine Act of 1813
managers.39' The institution was also required to make regular reports to
Congress and to limit its activities to the prevention of smallpox.3 Otherwise
the bill largely formalized Smith's previous proposals.390
After considerable debate on November 28, the bill was held over to a third
reading on a 5 1-44 vote.39' A few days later, there was a brief debate over the
power of Congress to establish corporations which pervade the United States.392
Some congressman wanted to make explicit that the institution was to be in-
corporated in Washington where Congress had clear authority to grant a corpo-
rate charter. Others felt that the very presence of such language was counter-
productive and would imply that Congress had the power to incorporate an
institution elsewhere. The issue was eventually dropped since Smith's insti-
tution was clearly intended for Washington, and the House passed the bill.393
In the Senate, the bill was reported without amendment by the District of
Columbia Committee.394 Apparently there was at least some opposition to the
bill in the Senate. In a letter to Senator Horsey dated January 26, Dr. Smith
complains that does not understand why intelligent men [Senators], who rep-
resent a Numerous & enlightened people should feel themselves constrained to
oppose this institution & indulge in the most pointed disapprobation of our
views.  Smith mentions that there were no raging smallpox epidemics at the
time.39' He also notes that many physicians were opposed to his institution for
distributing vaccine to
3885eeH.R. 35,  2.
389 See id. % 2-3.
 For example, the bill required Smith to oer $10 subscriptions and post a
$40,000 bond, both of which he had already done. See H.R. 35,  4; supra text
accompanying note 366, 370.
'' See 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 462 (1820).
9927 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONG. 8 (1820)
i See id. at 8-9.
 See 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 462 (1821).
Letter from James Smith to Senator Horsey (Jan. 26, 1821), supra note 249,
at 5. at 7, 9.
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laypersons and taking business from the physicians.397 Dr. Smith also led a
lengthy report to Congress on February 16, 1821 to defending his institution.398
The extent or source of Senatorial opposition is dicult to gauge. No further
action was taken on the bill in the session. Perhaps another attempt in the next
session would have been successful, but the Tarboro tragedy intervened ending
any hope of federal support for vaccination for almost a century.
VI. The Tarboro Scandal and the End of the Vaccine Act
After nine years of failed attempts to obtain funding for the Vaccine Agent,
, the Vaccine Act of 1813 was repealed altogether in 1822 in the wake of the
Tarboro Tragedy. Dr. Smith accidentally caused a epidemic in Tarboro, North
Carolina which eventually killed ten people. The underlying cause of the repeal
of the 1813 Act is open to question. The Congressional rhetoric focused on
federalism and anti-monopoly sentiment although Dr. Smith himself blamed
conniving special interests. Perhaps the Tarboro incident provided the oppor-
tunity for long-standing opponents of the Act to achieve its repeal. However, it
is more likely that the repeal was simply a politically expedient response to a
deadly mistake. Representative Burton of North Carolina led the assault on the
bill, and by all indications he was not motivated by ideology. Instead, Burton
advanced his own political ends by appealing to the anger of his constituents.
The repeal left the country without a reliable national source of vaccine until
the rise of large pharmaceutical companies at the end of the century.
 See Smith, Report supra note 144, at 7. 398 Smith, Report, supra note
144, at cover page.
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A. The FatalAccident
On November 1, 1821, Dr. Smith appointed a Dr. Ward an auxiliary vaccine
agent for Tarboro, North Carolina and sent him smallpox vaccine.399 Early in
the year Dr. Smith had received an urgent request for vaccine from Plymouth,
North Carolinai Apparently the disease had spread inland to Tarboro, less
than fty miles distant. However, instead of glass slides with cow-pox virus, Dr.
Ward somehow received a paper yer postmarked November 9 containing scabs
of smallpox, not cow-pox.40' The paper was marked in Smith's handwriting
with Variol. an abbreviation of variolous, Latin for smallpox.2 Not recogniz-
ing the Latin annotation, Dr. Ward proceeding to inoculate his patients with
the smallpox virus. Not surprisingly, Dr. Ward's patients suered mild cases of
small-pox; they had been variolated, not vaccinated. Unfortunately, the vario-
lations instigated a small epidemic in the surrounding counties; by late winter,
sixty people were aicted and ten people had died.3
Dr. Smith attempted to cooperate with Dr. Ward as best he could. Upon
rst hearing of the eect the vaccine had on Dr. Ward's patients, Dr. Smith
suggested that perhaps the vaccine had transmuted in shipment into a new
strain of small-pox, varioloid which had just been identied in Europe.' After
further communication with Dr. Ward,
's See Open Letter from Dr. Ward (Feb. 7, 1822), supra note 125, at
142. See also Letter from Lewis Condict, Member of House Committee of
Vaccination, to Dr. Ward (June 7, 1826) in H. REP. No. 19-95, at 4 (1827).
The Condict letter claims that the vaccine was mailed on November 21;
' See Letter from James Smith to Senator Horsey, supra note 249, at 7.
' See H. REP. No. 19-95, at 2 (1827).
402 See Letter from Dr. Ward to Dr. Smith (Jan 28, 1822) in 3 VACCINE
INQUIRER 122, 124 (1822), supra
note 125. Extensive amounts of correspondence regarding the incident and
its aftermath are reprinted in
3 VACCiNE INQUIRER 112-192 (1822), supra note 125.
403 See JOHNSON, supra note 121, at 736.
 See H. REP. NO. 17-48 (1822).
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Smith realized that he had probably sent samples of small-pox to Dr. Ward
by accident.605 He immediately sent one of his agent to the area to provide
genuine vaccine and expertiseA Fearing that he might have made similar mis-
takes in sending vaccine to other parts of the country, Smith widely distributed
a circular in January 1822 warning physicians that the vaccine he had sent out
in the past year might be tainted j07 Though obviously sent with the noblest of
intentions, the circular caused a national uproar and lent great aid to the many
skeptics and opponents of vaccination.40'
The local community in North Carolina meanwhile was becoming under-
standably incensed with Dr. Ward for starting the epidemic. Ward complained
that I have been much abused; have been charged, by some, of introducing it
[smallpox] from lucrative motives; and, in addition to which, and worst of all, am
accused of having received matter with the Latin word for small pox; and this
has been magnied until it has become a serious charge.609 Dr. Ward's failure,
as a physician, to recognize the Latin marking for smallpox was unforgivable.410
Moreover, a trained physician should have been able to distinguish between a
dried kine-pox pustule and a dried smallpox pustule. Dr. Smith expressed what
must have been on the minds of many: If Dr. Ward had been at all conversant
405 See id.; Letter from James Smith to Speaker of House of Representatives
(Feb. 4, 1822), H. DOC. NO.
17-57 (1822). Smith kept smallpox samples on hand in order to test the
ecacy of his vaccine. See supra
note 248.
406 See Letter from Dr. Hunter to James Smith (Jan. 19, 1822) in 3 VACCINE
INQuIRER 120, 121 (1822),
supra note 125.
407 See Adavit of James Smith, supra note 117, at 6; the circular is reprinted
in 3 VACCINE INQUIRER
125 (1822), supra note 125.
408 See, e.g., H. REP. No. 17-48 (1822) (committee decrying that incident
had sowed doubt as to ecacy of
vaccination and repeatedly rearming their faith in vaccination).
409 Letter from Dr. Ward to Dr. Smith (Jan 28, 1822), supra note 402, at
124.
410 Dr. Ward later changed his story and claimed that there were no mark-
ings on the package from Dr. Smith. See Letter from Dr. Ward to Dr. Clendi-
nen (Feb. 21, 1822) in 3 VACCINE INQUIRER 143 (1822), supra note 125.
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with either the kine-pock or small pox scabs, he could not have failed to
detect the mistake.41' The obvious strategy for Dr. Ward was to begin pub-
licly shifting the blame to Dr. Smith. According to Smith, all of a sudden
Dr. Ward began excit[ing] public prejudices against him.4'2 In a public letter,
Ward asked those who, from the vilest prejudice, have heaped upon me much
personal abuse, to desist since the whole aair was Smith's fault.413 Ward ques-
tioned Dr. Smith's competence given his failure to eradicate the smallpox from
Baltimore.414 He also mentioned that a mysterious new strain of smallpox had
appeared in Baltimore but left to the public's imagination the origins of this
new disease and its connection to the Dr. Smith and the Tarboro Tragedy.415
The most vociferous attack against Dr. Smith, his institution, and the Vaccine
Act was, however, led by Representative Burton of North Carolina.
B. The Repeal of the Vaccine Act of 1813
Representative Burton wanted to eliminate not only Dr. Smith, but his
Vaccine Institution.41' Even Dr. Ward agreed that the Vaccine Institution pro-
vided an enormous service to the nation and should not be abandoned: It is,
however, my serious wish, that the National Vaccine Institution, as proposed
by him [Smith], may be carried into eective operation, and that the citizens of
the United States will not suer it to languish in the
Smallpox in the Town of Tarborough, 1 VACCiNE INQUIRER 45, 47 (1822),
supra note 125. But it appears
that vaccination had not yet become common in that part of North Carolina.
Dr. Ward reports that just
1% of his community had been vaccinated. See Open Letter from Dr. Ward
(Feb. 7, 1822), supra note
125, at 140.
412 The North Carolina Accident, 3 VACCINE INQUIRER 111 (1822), supra
note 125.
413 Open Letter from Dr. Ward (Feb. 7, 1822), supra note 125, at 141.
414 See id. at 140.
415 See id. at 142.
416 Hutchins Gordon Burton served as an Anti-Democrat representative
from North Carolina between December 1819 and March 1824. His attacks
on the Vaccine Institution in 1822 may have been political astute. He was
elected Governor of North Carolina in 1824. SeeBIOGRAPi-IICAL DIREC-
TORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1961, at 636 (1961) also available
asH. DOC. NO. 85-442 (1961).
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consequence of one fatal mistake.417 Ward only wanted to place all of the
responsibility for the Tarboro Tragedy at Dr. Smith's feet. He suggested that
perhaps Dr. Smith should be replaced as National Vaccine Agent. Representa-
tive Burton on the other hand was fond of calling Smith's institution a 'nuisance
of the most dangerous kind.'41' Burton claimed that Dr. Smith had 'slaughtered
with indierence' citizens of North Carolina.41'
In the House debate over the repeal of the 1813 Act, Representative Burton
alleged that something like $45,000 had been drawn, by the agent [Smith], from
dierent quarters of the Union and implied that the Act was 'taxing the people
at large for the prot of the agent of vaccination.'420 Smith responded that he
had never received so much money and had spent much more than he received on
running his Institution.42' Burton also challenged Smith's competence by noting
that smallpox prevailed in Baltimore to an extent greater than in any part of the
United States. While smallpox was prevalent in Baltimore in 1822, Baltimore
was one of nations largest port cities and had a high rate of vaccination.422 It
is also doubtful that Baltimore suered from smallpox signicantly more than
other large Eastern ports.423 Finally, Burton absurdly suggested that Smith had
introduced small pox into the interior of the country, where in all probability, it
would not have found its way for forty years, but for this agency. 424 All evidence
indicates that Smith had only sent vaccine to the interior of the country. No one
alleged that he had previously sent smallpox anywhere. If Burton is referring
417 Open Letter from Dr. Ward (Feb. 7, 1822), supra note 125, at 142.
 JOHNSON, supra note 121, at 736.
419 Id. at 736.
420 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1638 (1822); Letter from James Smith to Senator
Lloyd (Apr. 25, 1822), appended to H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822).
421 See Letter from James Smith to Senator Lloyd (Apr. 25, 1822) appended to
H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822).
422 See Smallpox in Baltimore, 2 VACCINE INQUIRER 74 (1822), supra
note 125.
423 See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
424 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1635 (1822).
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to the coastal town of Tarboro, Smith turned his attention to that region of
North Carolina only after smallpox had appeared there earlier in the year.425
On January 30, 1822, Representative Burton demanded that a select com-
mittee of the House be appointed to investigate Smith's negligence.42' A number
of congressman who rose to praise Dr. Smith's integrity and professional talents
and experience, but agreed that an investigation should be instituted. They felt
that an investigation could only exonerate Smith.427 The House decided to wait
for the results of an investigation by a group of Baltimore physicians.42' Within
a couple of weeks, a select committee was appointed to look into whether the
1813 Act should be repealed. The committee's February 22 report was quite
favorable to Dr. Smith.42' The committee decided that though an unfortunate
tragedy had occurred, the benets of vaccination were too great to repeal the
1813 Act. After cataloguing the successful eorts of various European govern-
ments at mandatory vaccination, the committee recommended that no changes
be made to the 1813 Act.430 This favorable report led Representative Burton to
demand in March that another select committee be appointed. He was clear that
his object.. . is to repeal the law, or place the institution on a more respectable
footing.. . the present agency was not only a nuisance, but a nuisance of the
most dangerous kind.43' Burton had himself appointed to this second committee
and authored its April 13 report. Predictably, the report was harshly critical of
Dr. Smith and reported a bill
425 See supra text accompanying note 400.
426 See 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 851.52 (1822).
427 See id. at 852-53.
428 See id. at 854. I have not found any other reference to this investigation.
429 See 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1382 (1822); H. REP. NO. 17-48 (1822). This
report is reprinted at 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 1130-33 (1822).
430 See H. REP. No. 17-48 (1822).
 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1382 (1822).
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repealing the 1813 Vaccine Act.432 In March, Smith oered to resign his
commission so that the National Institution could continue to safeguard the
nation's vaccine supply under a new Vaccine Agent but to no avail.433 The
House voted to repeal the Vaccine Act on April  After considerable debate,
the Senate concurred on May 2, 1822.
Well before this time, the attacks against Dr. Smith had reached a fever
pitch. In addition to attacks from Dr. Ward and Representative Burton, Smith's
own circular had incited tremendous national outrage. There was speculation
that Dr. Smith had purposely tried to start an epidemic in order to increase his
sales of vaccine.43' Dr. Smith's commission was revoked by President Monroe
on April  as a consequence of the violent prejudices against him.43' Dr. Smith
himself blamed not Dr. Ward or Representative Burton so much as physicians
opposed to his championing of lay vaccination and free certication of vaccina-
tions by mail.439 Smith accused these physicians of using the scandal to raise a
furor against the Act. According to Smith, 'Down with the vaccine agency' is
the popular cry of these economic interests.460
There might have been some truth to Dr. Smith's suspicions. In addition
to ad hominem attacks on Dr. Smith, Congressional opponents of the Vaccine
Act did repeatedly
432 See H. Rep. No. 17-93 (1822). This report is reprinted at 39 ANNALS
OF CONG. 1544-45 (1822).
 See Letter from Dr. Smith to Representative Sergeant (Mar. 20, 1822)
reprinted in 4 VACCiNE INQUIRER 151-52 (1822), supra note 125.
 See 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1640 (1822). The vote was 102-57.
 See 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 440 (1822). An earlier eort to procedurally derail
the repeal eort was defeated 29-9. See 7 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF
CONG. 206 (1822).
 See H. REP. No. 19-95, at 2 (1827).
497 See Letter from John Q. Adams, Secretary of State, to Dr. Smith (Apr. 10,
1822) in 4 VACCINE INQUIRER 178 (1822), supra note 125.
'' 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1637 (1822).
 See Letter from James Smith to Senator Lloyd (Apr. 25, 1822) appended to
H. Rep. No. 17-48 (1822);
supra text accompanying notes 291-295.
440 Letter from James Smith to Senator Lloyd (Apr. 25, 1822) appended to H. Rep.
No. 17-48 (1822).
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raise anti-monopoly and economic-freedom arguments. The Burton com-
mittee report was skeptical of an institution, clothed with the character of a
lucrative monopoly or privilege.' In the oor debate, another representative
from North Carolina condemned the monopoly granted to the Vaccine Agent
by his title and franking privilege: the exclusive circulation of [vaccine] matter
through the country, to the destruction of that competition which is the life
442
Another re
of trade and of profession. presentative claimed that the Agent's monopoly
discouraged other medical professionals from striving to maintain supplies
of vaccine.443 On the other hand, a search of Congressional records both pub-
lished and at the National Archives has not uncovered even one memorial from
physicians complaining about the 1813 Act. Memorials were the primary means
of lobbying Congress at the time. Perhaps the rhetoric in Congress was more
ideological than representative of some narrow business interest.
The dominant theme of Burton and his allies was another time-honored
mode of American political rhetoric|federalism. Opponents of the Act argued
repeatedly that the 1813 Act was an inappropriate exercise of federal power.
The main thrust of Burton's committee report was that regulations for the
preservation of the public health are questions of police, wisely committed to
local government.4 Moreover, the report questioned
whether the General [i.e., Federal] Government can benecially interpose for
the furtherance of an object which seems in a peculiar manner to appertam to
the municipal authorities in the several States, and which must, of necessity,
be nally committed to the management and discretion of professional men
possessing the condence of the community.445
'H. Rep. No. 17-93 (1822).
442 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1636 (1822) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
 See id. (statement of Rep. Eustis).
H. REP. NO. 17-93 (1822). 'Id.
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The committee doubted whether Congress can, in any instance, devise a sys-
tem which will not be more liable to abuses in its operations, and less subject
to a prompt and salutary control, then such as may be adopted by the local
authorities.' Burton trotted out his federalism arguments again in the oor de-
bates. Vaccination was. .. not properly within the province of this Government
but of the several States.447 Burton proceeded to compare the despotic power
exercised by governments in Europe in insisting on compulsory vaccination and
the limited role of the American government which can only let the people. ..
take care of themselves.44' Representative Eustis felt that This government. ..
was instituted to collect revenue, to provide for the public defense, and pay the
public debts and little more.449 Certainly the power to spend money to preserve
the vaccine supply was not granted Congress in x
While it is certainly possible that anti-monopoly and federalist concerns did
indeed play a prominent role in the repeal of the Act, I am tempted to conclude
that the rhetoric of economic freedom and federal power was little more than
rhetoric. The leading opponent of the Act, Representative Burton of North
Carolina, had made his goal of punishing Dr. Smith clear from the beginning.
His vociferous ad hominem attacks seem less motivated by Constitutional policy
than by the anger of his constituents in North Carolina. Moreover, supporters
of the Act did not directly respond to Burton's federalism and laissez-faire
arguments. Supporters focused on either defending Dr. Smith's integrity and
competence or on the need to continue the Institution under new leadership.45'
The supporters of the Act
446 Id.
44739 ANNALS OF CONG. 1634 (1822).
 Id. at 1635 (1822).
 Id. at 1640 (1822).
450 See U.S. CONST. Art. I,  8.
 39 ANNALS OF CONG. 1636-40 passim (1822).
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might have been fully aware that Burton's policy arguments were simply a
convenient cover for his political objective. In any case, the Act was repealed
in the span of three months, almost as quickly as it had been passed.
C. The Fate of Dr. James Smith and his National Vaccine Institution
Smith launched a large public relations campaign to defend the practice of
vaccination, restore his good name, and revive support for his institution. He
printed and distributed an announcement within a week of the Act's repeal.452
He reassured the public that even without his franking privilege his institution
would continue as before.453 He promised to continue distributing vaccine freely
and went as far as to say he would never charge for it.454 He also remained
committed to building a permanent vaccine institution based on private contri-
butions as outlined in his 1818 Prospectus.455 Smith even argued that Congress'
reaction to the Tarboro Tragedy proved that the public welfare required an insti-
tution independent of the government and its political whims.45' Smith also put
out ve issues of a journal, The Vaccine Inquirer, allegedly published by a So-
ciety of Physicians of Baltimore.457 In the Inquirer, Smith published, unedited,
numerous documents associated with the Tarboro Tragedy hoping to set straight
the record as to his role in the Tarboro Tragedy. Apparently he had perma-
nently lost the public condence because he reports running out of funds in 1824
and having to retire in some measure, from the contest against smallpox.458
452 See SMITH, THE NATIONAL VACCINE INSTITUTION, supra note 171.
 See id.
 See JAMES SMITH, THE BALTIMORE VACCINE CATECi-HSM 17-22
(1824) (on le with Countway Rare
Books: Pamphlets on Small-pox, No. 21).
 See SMITH, THE NATIONAL VACCINE INSTITUTION, supra note 171.
See supra text accompanying
notes 365-371.
456 See id.
 See THE VACCINE INQUIRER (Baltimore, 5 Issues, Feb. 1822 - June 1824),
supra note 125. The contents
of the Vaccine Inquirer make clear that Smith was the actual publisher of
the journal.
458 James Smith, Memorial to Congress (1824) in 5 THE VACCINE INQUI-
IRER2O5, 212, supra note 125.
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Smith eventually went so far as to publicly allege that a Small Pox Plot was
behind the Tarboro Aair.459 He began insisting that the Tarboro incident was
not an accident at all but the malicious act of some unnamed conspiracy.4'0
At Dr. Smith's request a Congressional committee investigated the aair for
three years and seemed to credit much of Dr. Smith's account.46' Smith also
claimed that during this Congressional investigation, Certain manuscript papers
of considerable volume, relating entirely to the vaccine institution, and of no
other value were stolen.2 Based on these allegedly nefarious actions, Dr. Smith
repeatedly petitioned Congress over the following three years to restore his ap-
pointment as National Vaccine Agent and his franking privilege.463 In 1824, the
Congressional investigative committee even reported a bill to restore Smith's
appointment and franking privilege,464 but no signicant action was taken on
the bill.5
Ultimately Dr. James Smith and his Vaccine Institution passed from the
public consciousness. There is no mention of Dr. Smith in Congressional records
after 1827. We know that the Institution did not survive, because plans for a
national vaccine supply were proposed to Congress in 1838 and 1882. Congress
failed to give serious attention to either
 See SMITH, CATECHISM, supra note 454, at 20.
460 See Adavit of James Smith, supra note 117, at 5-7.
461 See H. REP. No. 18-78, at 2 (1824) (select committee did not see as
much reason for imputing its willful commission to those who were publicly
engaged [Smith].. . as to some secret hand... .); H. REP. No. 19-95, at 2 (1827)
(particularly suspicious of the eight day gap between when the circular was
addressed and when it was postmarked, given Dr. Smith's habit of immediately
mailing packages of vaccine). Dr. Ward did not respond to repeated inquiries
from the Congressional investigative committee. Id. at 2.
462 Adavit of James Smith, supra note 117, at 5-7.
463 See 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 576 (1823); H. REP No. 18-78 (1824); Letter
from James Smith to John Taylor, Speaker of the House of Rep. (Dec. 19, 1825)
inH. REP. NO 19-95 (1827).
' See H. REP. No. 19-95, at 3 (1827). The bill is reprinted at 5 THE
VACCINE INQUIRER 217 (1824), supra note 125.
465 The bill was reported and read twice on Feb. 9, 1824. See 41 ANNALS
OF CONG. 1740 (1824). The
1823 petition to reinstate his franking privilege was rejected as inexpedient.
40 ANNALS OF CONG. 643 (1823). The 1825 petition was never acted upon.
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proposal. We imagine him dying in 1841, a rather tragic gure|decades of
eorts to maintain a national vaccine supply harshly repudiated by his country
after one fatal accident without any credit for the thousands of lives he had
probably saved.
VII. Epilogue: Proposals After the Tarboro Tragedy
While the Tarboro Aair does not appear to have shaken public condence in
vaccination,4 it did seem to leave Congress with a disinclination to get involved
in the vaccine business. For eighty years after the Tarboro Tragedy, Federal
support for vaccination was limited to areas of special federal responsibility
such as the military,7 indians,' and Washington.46' The problem of maintaining
a national supply of vaccine was never seriously addressed again in the 19th
century and remained an impediment to the eradication of smallpox in the
United States. Congress seriously considered smallpox vaccine again in the
Progressive Era enactment of the Biologics Act.470 Two 19th century proposals
were never given serious attention by Congress.
In 1838, a physician from Connecticut, Dr. Sylvanus Fansher, petitioned
Congress to establish a national vaccine institution for the particular benet of
the Army, Navy, and Indians who were suering greatly from smallpox.47' Dr.
Fansher had apparently been practicing vaccination since 1801 and managed his
own Connecticut Vaccine Institution.472 Not much had changed in fteen-odd
years. Dr. Fansher noted that It is generally
See H. Rep. No. 19-95, at 1 (1827).
467 See Letter from Jonas Lovell, Surgeon General, U.S. Army to James
Barbous, Secretary of War,
H. DOC. NO. 19-90 (1826) (mandatory vaccination in Army since 1818).
468 See 4 Stat. 514 (1832) (authorizing payments of $6 per day for doctors who
were vaccinating Indians; the Secretary of War was obligated to provide these
doctors with genuine vaccine).
'See H. REP. No. 20-2 15 (1828) (Congressional authorization of Board of
Health for the city and approval of general vaccination in Washington during
smallpox outbreak).
 The Biologics Act, ch. 1378, 32 Stat. 728 (1902), 42 U.S.C.  41-48 (1997)
(repealed 1944).
' See FANSHER, supra note 141.
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understood... that the diculty of procuring the pure vaccine virus and per-
petuating it had ever been the greatest impediment to the practice of vaccination.473
The national vaccine
institution he proposed would, of course, maintain a supply of vaccine for the entire
country even though ostensibly targeted at the military and Native populations.
Either through ignorance or perhaps political adroitness, Fansher does not men-
tion Dr. James Smith and the 1813 Act. Dr. Fansher does not explicitly ask to
be named head of the national vaccine institution, but he does describe at some
length his dedicated charitable vaccination services, particularly to the mili-
tary over the past decade.474 There is no record of substantive Congressional
consideration of the proposal.
The next and nal 19th-century eort, which I am aware of, to establish a
national vaccine supply was in 1882 during an epidemic in the West. Separate
bills were introduced in the House and Senate475 motivated by many commu-
nications from physicians all over the West regarding the diculty of obtaining
pure vaccine.476 The problems faced by physicians at the beginning of the cen-
tury had not been solved. Vaccine contaminated with other viruses remained
an enormous problem: some of the vaccinations have been shown.. to have left
the people with diseases not very desirable.4 A House select committee unani-
mously recommended a bill which appropriated $15,000 to maintain a national
vaccine supply.47' The bill directed the recently constituted National Board of
Health to provide pure vaccine virus to all who request it, at cost. The focus of
the bill was not on providing free vaccine, but a
472 See id. at 2.
 Id. at 2.
 See id. at 2-12.
' SeeS. 1004, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. (1882); H.R. 2231, 47th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1882); see also H. Rep. No. 47-607 (1882).
476 See 13 CONG. REC. 862 (1882).
 See id.
 See 13 CONG. REC. 862 (1882).
78
85Rohit Singla The Vaccine Act of 1813
reliable source of vaccine. A suggestion that the bill have a time limit was
rejected since the bill would cost the government little and the vaccine supply
should be permanently maintained for future epidemics.47'
Unlike the debates between 1813 and 1824, there was signicant opposition
expressed based on a laissez-faire vision of government. Senator Maxey argued:
Why Congress should be buying vaccine virus any more than quinine or anything
else? I do not understand what we have to do with the question. .. . this
is converting the Government... into an apothecary's shop, to be dispensing
out medicines all over this whole country.4'0 Even senators in favor of the bill
agreed that It is true as an original proposition that the Government has not
any business to be furnishing vaccine matter or quinine, or anything else.. .
Supporters did not try to rebut the laissez-faire norm expressed by Senator
Maxey. Instead, supporters argued that the government was not giving away
vaccine for free but selling it at cost.482 Selling vaccine at cost, they argued, did
not violate laissez-faire norms; only giving vaccine away at government expense
was inappropriate. Also unlike the Congressional debates between 1813 and
1824, there was no discussion of the federalist questions. Though the bill passed
the Senate, it was never considered by the House.4'3 After the Civil War, the
weight of political rhetoric had clearly shifted from federalism as a restraint
on Congressional power to laissez-faire norms of limited government. Because
the 1882 record is so sparse, it is dicult to analyze whether Congressional
opposition to the federal vaccine production was sincerely based on a laissez-
faire ideology, or whether, as in earlier periods, ideological rhetoric was used to
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VIII. Conclusion
At the dawn of the 19th century, vaccination held out the potential of erad-
icating a major cause of death and disruption in American life. Compulsory
vaccination, the obvious solution adopted by Continental Europe, was probably
not an option given early American distrust of government and commitment to
liberty. Yet, there was much that governments could have done short of com-
pulsory vaccination to reap the blessings of this astounding medical advance.
Vaccination of the poor could have been subsidized, and vaccine institutions
could have been established to maintain a pure, uncontaminated supply of vac-
cine. The opportunity to save tens of thousands of lives was met by almost total
indierence by state governments. Perhaps for the rst time in the nation's his-
tory the intervention of the national government was essential to protect the
health of the populace, but even the federal government withdrew from the
eld after the Tarboro Tragedy.
American government inactivity in the face of smallpox's death toll is dif-
cult to explain under any of the dominant narratives of legal history. The
salus populi argument is most obviously undermined by the failure of govern-
ments to treat the welfare of the people as the supreme law. Arguments of
laissez-faire capitalism are simply absent from the debates over vaccination be-
tween 1809 and 1827. While arguments of federalism were raised repeatedly
in Congressional debates, they do not appear to have been sincerely advanced.
Federalism appears instead to have been simply a convenient cover for other
political interests or just another argument in the debate, not an absolute bar
to the enactment of comprehensive legislation. Besides, the inactivity of state
governments indicates that something more than federalism was afoot. The
business subsidy and public choice theories provide the best explanations for
the course of events, but neither on its own can explain the basic
483 See id.
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contradiction in Congress' response: Why did Congress so easily provide a
franking subsidy to the Vaccine Agent, but refuse so adamantly to fund his
eorts directly? We are left with little more than the historical fact that legis-
latures were reluctant to spend money.
Nonetheless, the Vaccine Act of 1813 was a dramatic legislative innovation.
Congress endorsed the ecacy of a drug and the benets of a public health
program for the rst time. Congress also recognized the need for an authorized,
semi-public national source for a drug. Physicians and the public could be con-
dent in the authenticity of Smith's vaccine backed as it was by the authority
of the national government. Had the Act not been repealed in 1822, Dr. Smith
probably could have raised enough money from charitable contributions to con-
tinue without government nancial support. The lack of public funding, while
providing a historical puzzle, appears to have been a surmountable issue. The
Vaccine Act of 1813 had given him the national stature to attract donations
from across the young nation. If the Tarboro Tragedy had not interfered or had
Dr. Smith had the public support to weather the scandal, his National Vaccine
Institution could have saved tens of thousands of American lives.
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